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A N N E  C .  D A I L E Y  &  L A U R A  A .  R O S E N B U R Y  
The New Law of the Child 
abstract. This Article sets forth a new paradigm for describing, understanding, and shaping 
children’s relationship to law. The existing legal regime, which we term the “authorities frame-
work,” focuses too narrowly on state and parental control over children, reducing children’s inter-
ests to those of dependency and the attainment of autonomy. In place of this limited focus, we 
envision a “new law of the child” that promotes a broader range of children’s present and future 
interests, including children’s interests in parental relationships and nonparental relationships 
with children and other adults; exposure to new ideas; expressions of identity; personal integrity 
and privacy; and participation in civic life. Once articulated, these broader interests lay the foun-
dation for a radical reconceptualization of the ﬁeld of children and law. We propose a new tripartite 
framework of relationships, responsibilities, and rights that aims to transform how law treats chil-
dren and their interactions with others. The framework addresses children’s needs for state and 
parental control in many instances while also moving beyond those concerns to foster children’s 
interests in the here and now. 
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introduction 
This Article sets forth a new paradigm for describing, understanding, and 
shaping children’s relationship to law. The existing regime of laws relating to 
children hinges on the fundamental question of adult control over children and 
their development. We name and critique this prevailing approach the “author-
ities framework” and set forth the normative justiﬁcations and parameters for a 
new paradigm. We envision a “new law of the child” that promotes a wide range 
of children’s present and future interests in addition to assigning adult authority 
over children’s dependency and development. 
Our new paradigm is rooted in a broad understanding of children’s interests 
as children in the here and now, encompassing but moving beyond a develop-
mental focus on children’s dependency or their attainment of autonomy. Draw-
ing from the social science literature, scholarship on children and law, and judi-
cial decisions, we identify ﬁve broader interests that law should recognize and 
promote: children’s interests in parental and nonparental relationships, includ-
ing relationships with children and other adults; exposure to new ideas; expres-
sions of identity; personal integrity and privacy; and participation in civic life. 
This new law of the child situates children’s interests within a normative uni-
verse that values the extraordinary richness and variety of children’s lives. Alt-
hough our approach would impose greater restrictions on adult authority in 
some circumstances, it also calls on law to be more attuned to children’s diverse 
interests within the family, school, and other arenas. We believe law should rec-
ognize, maintain, and promote a broader range of children’s relationships, in-
cluding relationships with nonparental adults and with other children. Relat-
edly, law should advance children’s exposure to new ideas in ways that will spur 
their curiosity, learning, and exploration of their own identities as they grow. 
Law should also ensure that children have opportunities to express themselves 
in school and elsewhere, while at the same time protecting children from intru-
sions on their bodily integrity and personal privacy. And, ﬁnally, law should seek 
to further children’s participation in civic life as a central component of their en-
gagement in the world. 
In bringing to light this broader range of children’s interests in the here and 
now, our approach highlights that children’s lives are more than lesser versions 
of adult lives or way stations on the road to autonomous adulthood. Our focus 
on children’s interests beyond dependency and autonomy takes account of the 
unique strengths and capacities of children, as well as the special vulnerabilities 
that distinguish human experience in this early stage of life. By focusing on chil-
dren’s lives in the here and now, we aim to free the ﬁeld of children and law from 
the ideal of the autonomous, freely acting adult individual. Our approach takes 
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seriously the idea of children as individuals in their own right, worthy of respect, 
even as they are dependent in varying ways upon the adults in their lives. 
By shifting the focus from adult authority to children’s broader interests, our 
framework opens up the possibility for a new conceptual ordering of the laws 
governing children. The ﬁeld of children and law is currently organized by loca-
tion: primarily home, school, and the juvenile justice system. The ﬁve interests 
we identify lead us to radically restructure the ﬁeld around a tripartite framework 
of relationships, responsibilities, and rights. We begin with relationships be-
cause children’s custodial status deﬁnes their ﬁrst and primary relationship to 
law. Yet our approach goes beyond acknowledging relationships of authority to 
encompass children’s nonhierarchical relationships with siblings, other children, 
and nonparental adults. These relationships in turn inform the second prong of 
the tripartite framework: adult responsibilities for children. While custodial 
caregivers have important responsibilities, we identify a broader set of actors 
who should carry legally recognized and shared responsibilities toward children, 
including state actors and adults outside the family. These adult responsibilities 
encompass duties related to caregiving and protection, education, rehabilitation, 
and fostering of civic engagement. The third and ﬁnal prong of the tripartite 
framework addresses the full range of rights that should be enjoyed by parents 
and children—not simply rights of authority—most importantly children’s af-
ﬁrmative rights to certain relationships, goods, and services. 
By restructuring the ﬁeld around relationships, responsibilities, and rights, 
we hope to identify and promote children’s broader interests in an integrated and 
consistent way. To this end, our approach reimagines the traditional “best inter-
ests of the child” standard, which until now has largely operated as a cover for 
the exercise of unprincipled judicial discretion based on poorly thought-out fac-
tors focused on children’s dependency. Our approach instead redeﬁnes the best 
interests standard in light of ﬁve broad interests—generous in scope and rich in 
content—that serve as fundamental, practical guides for judicial, administrative, 
and legislative decision-making across all domains of children’s lives. Under a 
best interests standard explicitly oriented around children’s broader interests, 
decisionmakers will be equipped to weigh children’s interests in a transparent, 
coherent, and consistent way in the domains of family, school, juvenile justice, 
immigration, and other arenas, always with an eye toward maximizing their pre-
sent and future well-being. 
Relatedly, the new law of the child loosens the grip of parental rights on 
American law. Under our approach, the law’s existing deference to parental 
rights in both statutes and legal decisions would give way to a more child-cen-
tered analysis that elevates children’s broader interests over parents’ individual 
liberty claims. Parental rights have a role to play under the new law of the child, 
but only to the extent they further children’s broader interests, which include 
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children’s interest in developing and maintaining relationships with their par-
ents free from state control. Parental rights should never automatically trump 
the interests of all others—most importantly, those of children themselves. For 
example, our approach would eliminate parental freedom to inﬂict corporal pun-
ishment on children on the ground that this type of punishment violates a child’s 
interests in bodily integrity and rehabilitation. Our framework would also limit 
parents’ rights to homeschool their children in most circumstances, requiring 
more intensive state oversight of homeschooling for children in the early years 
and prohibiting it altogether for most children past the primary grades, based 
primarily on children’s interest in exposure to ideas. We reject the classic defense 
of parental rights—that they are necessary to limit state intervention in the fam-
ily—by emphasizing the state’s existing presence in the lives of all children and 
the role parental rights may play in suppressing children’s diverse values and ex-
periences. Instead of ignoring conﬂicts within the family and between the family 
and the state over children’s present and future well-being, we accept such con-
ﬂicts as necessary for understanding and furthering the broad range of children’s 
interests as children. 
Moreover, our approach supports the recognition and enforcement of chil-
dren’s affirmative rights rooted in their broader interests in the here and now. 
The new law of the child rejects the Supreme Court’s decision in DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, which held that children have no 
affirmative right to safety within the home, thereby ignoring the shared respon-
sibilities of both parents and the state to further children’s interest in protection 
from harm at the hands of custodial caregivers.
1
 In a direct departure from ex-
isting constitutional law, the new law of the child would recognize children’s af-
ﬁrmative rights as children to certain goods and services essential to furthering 
their broader interests. In some cases, affirmative rights would entitle children 
to initiate court actions to enforce these rights, although these rights would pri-
marily be enforced in custody, visitation, school, immigration, and other pro-
ceedings. 
Our approach also reconceives children’s interests in exercising control over 
their own lives as “agency” rights rather than “autonomy” rights. We do so in 
order to emphasize that children often have the capacity to make decisions for 
themselves at the same time that they are dependent upon adults. For example, 
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme Court 
upheld the right of children to wear black armbands at school in protest of the 
Vietnam War.
2
 Although we support the Court’s holding that children possess 
free speech rights while in school, we do so not because children possess adult-
 
1. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
2. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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like autonomy rights, as the Court concluded, but rather because children have 
their own interests in exposure to the world of ideas and to expression of their 
developing views and identities. These rights are necessarily tailored to ﬁt chil-
dren’s broader interests, including their interests in safety and learning in school. 
Our conception of children’s agency rights reﬂects a richer, more nuanced con-
ception of children’s capacity to direct their own lives even while dependent upon 
a wide range of adults. 
Finally, the new law of the child attempts to put an end to seemingly futile 
debates over children’s “maturity.” The concept of maturity has emerged in re-
cent years as a focal point of legal decision making about children. Children who 
are deemed mature have access to adult rights and responsibilities, while those 
who are deemed immature remain subject to more paternalistic regulations. Yet 
focusing exclusively on maturity risks masking the real interests at stake in any 
given situation. For example, scholars and legal decision-makers struggle to rec-
oncile two well-accepted cases: Roper v. Simmons, holding that adolescents are 
not as responsible as adults and, hence, should not be subject to the death pen-
alty,
3
 and Bellotti v. Baird, holding that adolescents are often responsible enough 
to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.
4
 By focusing on children’s broader 
interests—rather than on “maturity” or “responsibility”—our approach illumi-
nates what is really at stake in these cases: in Roper, children’s interests in crimi-
nal rehabilitation and bodily integrity, and in Bellotti, children’s interests in sex-
uality, reproductive agency, expression of identity, and civic engagement. While 
maturity is not irrelevant to identifying and weighing these interests, it should 
not be the endpoint of the analysis. 
The new law of the child thus lays the foundation for revising or overruling 
many foundational Supreme Court decisions in addition to those already dis-
cussed. In Prince v. Massachusetts, for example, the Court upheld a Massachusetts 
child labor statute that prevented an eight-year-old girl from distributing reli-
gious literature on the street at night accompanied by her guardian, on the 
ground that the state’s parens patriae power justiﬁed the protection of the child 
from harm.
5
 By contrast, our approach would consider the child’s broad interests 
in her relationship with her guardian, in expressing her religious identity, and in 
engaging in the world beyond home and school. Similarly, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, which granted Amish parents the right to with-
draw their children from secondary school,
6
 failed to take account of children’s 
 
3. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
4. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
5. 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
6. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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interest in exposure to new ideas through educational opportunities outside the 
home. As already noted, our framework likely justiﬁes limits on homeschooling 
for older children and increased regulation of homeschooling for younger chil-
dren. The new law of the child would also take an entirely different approach to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville.
7
 Instead of relying on the 
primacy of parental rights to reject grandparents’ claims to maintain relation-
ships with their grandchildren, our framework would make children’s interests 
in maintaining relationships with nonparental ﬁgures the centerpiece of the 
analysis. 
Our reformulation of the ﬁeld of children and law permits a clearer exami-
nation of the ways law currently shapes children’s lives through its treatment of 
the parent-child relationship and through its construction of children’s depend-
ency. Because the existing authorities framework is presumed to reﬂect children’s 
lives as they are, its true expressive effects have remained unexamined. Looking 
closely, however, we see that the state intervenes in the parent-child relationship 
not simply at the back-end when disputes arise, but also at the front-end when 
conferring parental rights and family privacy. Legal scholars have generally failed 
to explore these expressive effects.
8
 This silence risks naturalizing a particular 
model of childhood, unnecessarily limiting the scope of reform by placing certain 
aspects of children’s lives beyond the reach of law. 
Law has the power to reﬂect and shape multiple aspects of children’s lives. 
The new law of the child seeks to recognize and promote facets of children’s lives 
beyond dependency and autonomy, thereby expanding and altering the law’s 
current focus. This new paradigm offers a more nuanced and comprehensive 
formulation of the ways in which law does, and does not, govern children’s lives. 
At the same time, our approach does more than reﬂect existing reality; it also 
signals that certain, presently unrecognized aspects of children’s lives should be 
valued by society. Our approach therefore aims to transform existing under-
standings of children and their interactions with each other and with adults. In 
this way, the new law of the child both uncovers aspects of children’s lives ob-
scured by existing law and draws upon these broader aspects to encourage new 
ways of living for both children and adults. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the history and current con-
ﬁguration of the prevailing approach to children and law—which we term the 
“authorities framework.” After describing the authorities framework, this Part 
 
7. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
8. For general discussions of the interplay between legal narratives and cultural narratives, see 
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 4 (1983); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986); and Marc 
Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 121 (Keith O. 
Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 2015). 
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goes on to enumerate its four major shortcomings: it fails to acknowledge and 
promote the well-being of children in the here and now; it unduly prioritizes 
parental rights over children’s interests; it perpetuates a myth of nonintervention 
in the family; and it relies on limited conceptions of both dependency and au-
tonomy. In Part II, we begin the task of identifying and elaborating children’s 
interests beyond autonomy and dependency that better take account of children’s 
lives in the here and now. These interests include children’s interests in relation-
ships with parents as well as with children and other adults; exposure to new 
ideas; expressions of identity; personal integrity and privacy; and participation 
in civic life. These ﬁve broader interests in turn lead us in Part III to reconceptu-
alize the ﬁeld of children and law around a new tripartite framework of relation-
ships, responsibilities, and rights, opening the door for legal decision makers to 
further children’s broader interests in a transparent, coherent, and consistent 
way across a myriad of legal domains. In so doing, this new law of the child seeks 
to better capture and promote the diversity and richness of children’s lives in the 
here and now. 
i .  the authorities framework and its failings 
The ﬁeld of children and law currently rests on the foundational question of 
who has authority over children’s lives—parents, the state, or (less frequently) 
children themselves.
9
 In addressing this question, courts and legislatures focus 
on identifying when children are dependent on adults and when they are capable 
of making independent decisions about their own lives. Analysis may be best 
conceptualized as an inverted triangle, with parents and the state occupying the 
top points and children the bottom.
10
  Lines of authority connect the three 
points, as courts and legislatures specify when parental authority over children 
trumps state interests, when state interests trump parental authority, and the 
rare instances when children’s desires trump both.
11
 
 
9. Throughout this Article, we use the term “child” to mean a person younger than the governing 
age of majority and not fully emancipated under law. In all states, the presumptive age of 
majority is eighteen, although for some purposes the age is either higher (alcohol consump-
tion) or lower (consensual sexual relations). See Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating Childhood, 
79 BROOK. L. REV. 525, 526-27 (2014). 
10. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 833-34 (2007); see 
also Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State, 2004 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 29 (“The competition for developmental control of a child is classically 
framed as a competition between parent and state.”). 
11. Rosenbury, supra note 10, at 833-34. 
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This emphasis on children’s dependency and eventual capacity underlies the 
entire ﬁeld of children and law, in large part because adult authority over chil-
dren derives its primary legal justiﬁcation from children’s dependent status. As 
the Supreme Court has explained, “The law’s concept of the family rests on a 
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and 
capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.”
12
 This legal 
conception of childhood is so widely accepted by U.S. courts, policymakers, and 
scholars that it has no name; it is simply the way things are.
13
 
We coin the term “authorities framework” to describe this current state of 
the ﬁeld. Doing so allows us both to better analyze the existing law governing 
children and to emphasize that the current organization of the ﬁeld is neither 
natural nor inevitable. Rather, this organization is rooted in a control-based con-
ception of parental rights that perpetuates the myth that the state does not in-
tervene in most families. Once we reveal this existing framework, we analyze 
how it leads to an unjustiﬁably narrow focus on dependency and autonomy to 
the exclusion of children’s other interests. 
A. The Authorities Framework 
The authorities framework is rooted in the early common-law property-
based theory of exclusive parental ownership of children. This theory located 
absolute control over children in parents—primarily fathers—based on actual or 
presumed biological ties.
14
 As Barbara Bennett Woodhouse describes, well into 
 
12. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
13. For representative samples of work in the ﬁeld of children and law, see MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (2005); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: 
THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2001); BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN 
SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE (2008); 
Appleton, supra note 9; Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The 
Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 
(1984); Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635 (2002); Anne C. Dailey, Children’s 
Constitutional Rights, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2099 (2011); Martha Minow, Whatever Happened to 
Children’s Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267 (1995); Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 
HARV. EDUC. REV. 487 (1973); Rosenbury, supra note 10; Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, 
Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children's Rights and the 
Problem of Equal Respect, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 799 (1999); and Michael S. Wald, Children’s 
Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255 (1979). 
14. This common-law regime addressed itself primarily to white children; slave children, for ex-
ample, were governed by a different set of laws. The legacy of this two-tier system is found 
in the child welfare system, which disproportionately involves African American families. See 
ROBERTS, supra note 13; Dorothy Roberts, Child Protection as Surveillance of African American 
Families, 36 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 426 (2014). Relatedly, after a period of widespread 
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the nineteenth century, a father could force his children to work and collect the 
wages for himself; he could marry off his female children to persons of his choos-
ing; and he determined where and with whom his children would reside, 
whether with himself, the mother, or some third party.
15
 In addition, fathers had 
the right to physically control and punish their children, in some states up to the 
point of death.
16
 This absolute control was often framed as an arrangement 
whereby fathers were obligated to provide for children in exchange for “labour 
and services,” although children were required to submit to that exchange.
17
 
Somewhat paradoxically, law prior to the late nineteenth century viewed chil-
dren as autonomous beings, still under the control of their parents but not sig-
niﬁcantly different from adults.
18
 Accordingly, this early regime did not condi-
tion parental control on children’s dependency or incapacity. 
This regime changed by the late nineteenth century, as the state assumed 
greater decision-making power and control over children. Parental control was 
no longer an absolute God-given right, but instead became a more limited, state-
conferred entitlement grounded in public concerns and children’s “best inter-
ests.”
19
 Although the state had long possessed a common-law duty toward “in-
fants, idiots, and lunatics,” the ascendant doctrine of parens patriae came to justify 
 
removal of children from reservations, custodial placements concerning American Indian chil-
dren are now governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 
(2012). 
15. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 13; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A 
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 313 (1998) [here-
inafter Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood]; see also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING 
THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 5 (1985) (noting that 
colonial American communities charged the father with the “duty of maintaining a well-gov-
erned home and sustained his authority by granting him control of its inhabitants as well as 
of family property and other resources”); STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REV-
OLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 1-17 (1988) (describing the patriar-
chal structure of Puritan families); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 
WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1139-40 (arguing that “the authority of colonial fathers over children clearly 
reﬂected the authoritarian views of sovereignty held by the likes of Hobbes and the Puritan 
Robert Bolton”). 
16. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as 
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1044-46 (1992). 
17. Id. at 1038 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 163 (1827)). 
18. See John Demos, The American Family in Past Time, 43 AM. SCHOLAR, Summer 1974, at 422, 
428. 
19. See Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 1037-40. 
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the state’s power to override parental authority in the name of children’s wel-
fare,
20
 sometimes with the goal of expanding state control over families of color, 
immigrant families, and other marginalized groups.
21
 At the same time, late 
nineteenth-century thinkers introduced the idea of children as innocent, de-
pendent beings different from adults and in need of special protection and care, 
thus strengthening the justiﬁcation for state intervention in children’s lives.
22
 
The emerging view of children as dependent, along with increasing state in-
volvement, ultimately dislodged traditional notions of children as property, 
bringing about the development of more humane labor, juvenile justice, and 
child welfare laws, as well as compulsory education laws.
23
 
Although the doctrine of absolute parental power has now been aban-
doned,
24
 the law nevertheless retains a strong commitment to parental rights. In 
case after case, the Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutional rights of par-
ents “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”
25
 
Indeed, as the Court has observed, “the interest of parents in the care, custody, 
and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 
interests recognized by this Court.”
26
 Of course, when parents fail to fulﬁll their 
 
20. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47; see also Sarah Abramowicz, Note, English 
Child Custody Law, 1660-1839: The Origins of Judicial Intervention in Paternal Custody, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1344 (1999) (tracing the term parens patriae through early English custody 
law). 
21. Cf. Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 1017-21 (describing the history of Oregon’s compulsory pub-
lic education law as an exercise of parens patriae authority reﬂecting both anti-Catholic assim-
ilationist goals as well as more egalitarian, progressive ideas for reform). 
22. See ROSALIND EKMAN LADD, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS RE-VISIONED: PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS 2 
(1996). 
23. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF 
CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) (recounting the long arc of the history of chil-
dren’s status in the United States). 
24. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (“[T]he state has a wide range of 
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s wel-
fare . . . .”). 
25. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 
65 (2000) (plurality opinion) (stressing the importance of parents’ interest in the care and 
control of their children); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (referring to the right 
to raise one’s children as “essential”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (same). 
This authority ﬂows in part from constitutional and common-law notions of family privacy. 
See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (recognizing, in a case litigated under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, that the family is “a unit with broad parental 
authority over minor children”); see also Buss, supra note 10, at 29 (discussing the traditional 
“exclusion of other private parties competing with parents for some or all control over a child’s 
upbringing”). 
26. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. 
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caregiving duties, they may forfeit their rights: the state may subject parents to 
criminal prosecution for neglect or abandonment, or it may subject them to civil 
child welfare proceedings that can lead to the termination of parental rights al-
together.
27
 But if parents minimally fulﬁll their duties, the state protects their 
relationships with their children and their childrearing choices.
28
 Contemporary 
judges, policymakers, and scholars therefore generally embrace parental rights 
as the appropriate starting point for protecting children’s interests.
29
 Children 
are no longer considered property, but they remain under the direction and con-
trol of parents in the ﬁrst instance. 
The authorities framework has evolved somewhat in recent decades as mod-
ern courts and legislatures have begun to recognize children’s rights and auton-
omy interests in some contexts. Of course, children have long enjoyed certain 
constitutional liberties, such as the right not to be enslaved under the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life or liberty under 
the Due Process Clause.
30
 Nevertheless, well into the twentieth century, children 
 
27. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982) (holding that the Due Process Clause 
requires that the state support its allegations of unﬁtness with clear and convincing evidence). 
28. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (ﬁnding that “all Illinois parents are con-
stitutionally entitled to a hearing on their ﬁtness before their children are removed from their 
custody”). 
29. A few legal scholars, most notably Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, have critiqued the continuing 
coercion inherent in this conception of parental rights, in which power ﬂows in only one, top-
down direction. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspec-
tive on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Of Ba-
bies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings: Discerning Parenthood in Irrational Action, 81 VA. L. REV. 
2493, 2520 (1995); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Out of Children’s Needs, Children’s Rights”: 
The Child’s Voice in Deﬁning the Family, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 321 (1994); Woodhouse, supra note 
16, at 999-1002 (arguing that Meyer and Pierce view children as parents’ private property). 
Nevertheless, most scholars justify law’s commitment to parental rights on the ground that 
parental rights are in fact the best way to further children’s interests. See, e.g., Katharine K. 
Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1523, 1543-45 (1998) (emphasizing that parental decision-making is necessary because 
children are “emotionally dependent,” and they need the parental relationship in order to ac-
quire “the ability to learn and reason and develop”); Buss, supra note 13, at 656 (“[T]he ben-
eﬁts to children, ﬁrst acknowledged when parental rights were conceived in proprietary terms, 
now stand as an independent justiﬁcation for continuing to afford parents a tremendous de-
gree of control.”); see also Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights after Troxel v. Gran-
ville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279, 284-90; John E. Coons, Intellectual Liberty and the Schools, 1 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 495, 506-10 (1985); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating 
Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 940-41 (1996); Ferdinand Schoeman, 
Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family, 91 ETHICS 6, 17 (1980); 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children’s Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071, 
1077-79 (2003); Scott & Scott, supra note 13, at 2415. 
30. See Dailey, supra note 13, at 2100. 
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enjoyed—at best—only a minimal set of entitlements associated with basic lib-
erties. Beginning in the 1960s, courts and legislatures independently acknowl-
edged children’s developing capacities and, in some contexts, concluded that 
older children have sufficient cognitive and emotional skills to entitle them to 
certain negative rights similar to those enjoyed by adults.
31
 In 1967, the Supreme 
Court expressly conﬁrmed that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill 
of Rights is for adults alone,” ﬁnding that older children have constitutional 
rights for purposes of juvenile delinquency proceedings.
32
 Since In re Gault, the 
Court has issued a series of decisions recognizing autonomy rights for children, 
including Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, which held 
that older children have adult constitutional rights for purposes of school 
speech.
33
 
This recognition of children’s autonomy comes into play most often with re-
spect to adolescent decision making outside of the home, particularly at school 
and in the labor market.
34
 Occasionally, however, judges may take older chil-
dren’s views into account even when addressing family disputes, such as in the 
areas of custody
35
 and healthcare decision-making.
36
 Criminal law often treats 
children as autonomous legal actors, with states enacting laws that permit, and 
 
31. See, e.g., GUGGENHEIM, supra note 13, at 1-16 (providing a “brief history” of arguments in favor 
of children’s rights beginning in the 1960s). 
32. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 794 
(2011) (“No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to protect children from harm, but that 
does not include a free-ﬂoating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.” 
(internal citations omitted)); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (plurality opinion) 
(ﬁnding that a law requiring parental consent to obtain an abortion violated minors’ due pro-
cess rights). 
33. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
34. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1294.3 (West 2011) (permitting employment of minors for certain 
occupations); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (declaring that students have free speech rights in 
school). 
35. In New York custody disputes, for instance, courts must weigh the child’s wishes, but must 
also “consider the age and maturity of the child and the potential for inﬂuence having been 
exerted on the child.” Eschbach v. Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1263-64 (N.Y. 1982). When a 
judge believes that the child’s feelings may be “transient,” the judge may give no weight to the 
child’s wishes. Lincoln v. Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 1969). 
36. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647 (“[E]very minor must have the opportunity—if she so desires—to 
go directly to a court without ﬁrst consulting or notifying her parents. If she satisﬁes the court 
that she is mature and well enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on 
her own, the court must authorize her to act without parental consultation or consent.”); 
Smith v. Seibly, 431 P.2d 719, 723 (Wash. 1967) (“A married minor, 18 years of age, who has 
successfully completed high school and is the head of his own family, who earns his own living 
and maintains his own home, is emancipated for the purpose of giving a valid consent to 
surgery . . . .”). 
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in some circumstances require, juvenile offenders to be tried in adult criminal 
court.
37
 Respecting children’s autonomy interests sometimes calls for an individ-
ualized examination of a child’s maturity, as in emancipation hearings and judi-
cial bypass hearings in the abortion context.
38
 At other times, respecting chil-
dren’s autonomy interests entails a categorical drop in the age at which children 
may be treated like adults, as may be the case with driving,
39
 sexual activity,
40
 
and the prosecution of some crimes.
41
 
The modern trend toward recognizing children’s autonomy in certain con-
texts has nevertheless failed to alter law’s view of children as fundamentally de-
pendent beings in need of adult supervision and control.
42
 One need not master 
the ﬁeld of children and law to recognize that our legal system denies children 
basic personal, social, and political rights. Most children do not have state or 
 
37. Forty-ﬁve states allow juvenile cases to be transferred to adult court at the judge’s discretion; 
in ﬁfteen of those states, transfer is mandatory for some offenses. Patrick Griffin et al., Trying 
Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting, U.S. DEP’T JUST., OFF. JUV. 
JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION 3 (Sept. 2011), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434
.pdf [http://perma.cc/GUY3-JE7S]; see also Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and 
Youth: Now the Twain Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 33-39 (2013) (providing back-
ground on juvenile transfer laws). In other states, prosecutors have the discretion to ﬁle 
charges for certain crimes in adult or juvenile court. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.557(1)(a), 
(b) (West 2008). 
38. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-150 (West 2009) (emancipation); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 
643-44 (judicial bypass). 
39. The age at which minors may drive is as low as fourteen in South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 32-12-11 (2011), and as high as seventeen in New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-13.4 (West 
2012). 
40. For discussions of variable ages of sexual consent, see Carissa Byrne Hessick & Judith M. Stin-
son, Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the Scope of Substantive Law, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 5 (2013); 
Anna High, Good, Bad and Wrongful Juvenile Sex: Rethinking the Use of Statutory Rape Laws 
Against the Protected Class, 69 ARK. L. REV. 787 (2016); and Michelle Oberman, Regulating 
Consensual Sex with Minors: Deﬁning a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703 (2000). 
41. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History 
and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO 
THE CRIMINAL COURT 83, 127-28 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000). 
42. Indeed, by the mid-1990s, most scholars in the United States had abandoned their children’s 
rights projects. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 13, at 42 (“The immutable truth of childrearing 
is that someone has to be in charge.”); Minow, supra note 13. 
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federal rights to vote,
43
 marry,
44
 work for wages,
45
 make healthcare decisions,
46
 
have sex,
47
 travel,
48
 refuse an education,
49
 be on the streets at night,
50
 purchase 
pornography,
51
  attend (or not attend) religious services against parental 
wishes,
52
 or enjoy most other freedoms enjoyed by adults. Justice Powell stated 
that these differences “abound in our law: in contracts, in torts, in criminal law 
and procedure, in criminal sanctions and rehabilitation, and in the right to vote 
and to hold office.”
53
 Far from being left alone to make their own choices, chil-
dren are directed by their parents and the state into relationships, activities, ed-
ucational instruction, and ways of life not of their own choosing.
54
 
Children’s rights therefore remain relatively limited and qualiﬁed despite 
language in Supreme Court decisions suggesting that children broadly enjoy 
 
43. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
44. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3(A) (West 2016). However, a child may marry with pa-
rental permission. See, e.g., id. § 3(B). 
45. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.2 (2017) (setting a “general 16-year minimum age which applies to all 
employment” other than agriculture and with other limited exceptions). 
46. Traditionally, children under eighteen cannot consent to medical treatment; doctrines like the 
mature minor doctrine make an exception for children of sufficient maturity. See Shawna 
Benston, Not of Minor Consequence?: Medical Decision-Making Autonomy and the Mature Minor 
Doctrine, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2016). 
47. In Georgia, for instance, two ﬁfteen-year-olds who engage in sex are guilty of a misdemeanor. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3 (2016). In Michigan, two ﬁfteen-year-olds who engage in sex are 
guilty of a felony. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520d (West 2004). 
48. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (noting that, at common law, 
parents or guardians control the physical freedom of unemancipated minors). 
49. All states require parents to send their children to public school or otherwise provide them an 
education. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802 (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690.1 
(2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111 (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (2015); 24 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.225.010 (West 
2011). 
50. See Schleifer ex rel. Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998); State v. 
J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 2004). But see Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 187 (2d Cir. 
2003) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a town curfew and striking it down based on the 
town’s failure to tie the policy to the “special traits, vulnerabilities, and needs of minors”). 
51. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
52. In Vermont, for instance, parents have the statutory right to control a child’s religion. VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 664(1)(A) (2010). This right is so critical that the Vermont Supreme 
Court has stricken portions of a family court order prohibiting both parents from requiring 
children “to attend religious services against their will.” Jakab v. Jakab, 664 A.2d 261, 266 (Vt. 
1995). 
53. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 591 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
54. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 10, at 29-31; Rosenbury, supra note 10, at 857-58. 
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constitutional rights.
55
 For example, children have free speech rights in school 
only so long as that speech does not disrupt the learning environment.
56
 Adoles-
cent girls have substantive due process rights to choose to terminate a pregnancy, 
but states may condition girls’ access to abortion on parental consent or judicial 
determinations of maturity or best interests.
57
 Rather than bestowing broad au-
tonomy rights on children, the Court regularly reiterates the view of children as 
dependent beings with lesser rights than adults. As the Court has explained, 
“[c]hildren, by deﬁnition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of 
themselves.”
58
 Rather, it remains the case that, under the law, “[t]hey are as-
sumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, 
the State must play its part as parens patriae.”
59
 
Moreover, courts, policymakers, and scholars increasingly draw on empirical 
studies to argue that children are less mature than the law has generally pre-
sumed.
60
 In a series of juvenile sentencing decisions involving older adolescents, 
 
55. See Dailey, supra note 13. 
56. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (granting broader 
free speech rights to adults). 
57. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (plurality opinion) (upholding parental con-
sent requirements as long as the state also “provide[s] an alternative procedure [such as a 
judicial determination of maturity or best interests] whereby authorization for the abortion 
can be obtained”). 
58.  Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). 
59. Id. A decade and a half earlier, the Supreme Court upheld a state law prohibiting the sale of 
pornography to minors. The Court, paraphrasing a member of the Columbia University Psy-
choanalytic Clinic, noted that “a child might not be as well prepared as an adult to make an 
intelligent choice as to the material he chooses to read.” Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 
642 n.10 (1968). In Justice Stewart’s words, the child “is not possessed of that full capacity for 
individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.” Id. at 649-50 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
60. For examples of recent case law, see Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471-72 & 472 n.5 (2012), 
which held that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for individuals under eighteen 
years old at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishments; J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 nn.5-6 (2011), which held 
that a child’s age should inform the Miranda analysis; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 74-
75 (2010), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of life without 
parole sentences on juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide and that the state must 
give convicted juvenile nonhomicide offenders a meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
from incarceration; and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-74 (2005), which held that the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of individuals who were under 
eighteen years old at the time of their capital crime. For an example of scholarship, see Richard 
J. Bonnie & Elizabeth S. Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain Research and the Law, 22 
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the Supreme Court recognized children’s “inherent difference from adults in 
their capacity as agents, as choosers, as shapers of their own lives.”
61
 In Roper v. 
Simmons, the Court ruled that a state law permitting the execution of defendants 
who committed their crimes as juveniles was unconstitutional.
62 Even seven-
teen-year-olds, the Roper Court explained, are often more immature, irresponsi-
ble, impetuous, and reckless than adults and therefore less culpable for their 
crimes and less deserving of severe punishment.
63
 This assessment relied, in 
part, on empirical studies indicating that adolescent brains are not fully formed 
and that the prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for strategizing, setting pri-
orities, and controlling impulses, is particularly underdeveloped in adoles-
cence.
64
 Subsequent decisions in the criminal justice context continue to describe 
minors as inherently less capable—and thus less culpable—than adults.
65
 
The authorities framework’s recognition of adolescents’ autonomy thus re-
mains muddled, leading to contradictory conclusions about children’s capacity 
but not much else. Federal and state laws now specify differing bright-line ages 
for when children become legal adults for purposes of marriage, sexual activity, 
employment, driving, drinking, voting, and criminal prosecution.
66
 Similarly, 
courts have determined that children enjoy adult-like rights of speech, privacy, 
and association for some purposes, but must wait until adulthood before they 
may exercise these rights fully.
67
 The diverse and shifting nature of these age cut-
offs speaks volumes about the difficulty—and, in some cases, the futility—of at-
tempting to justify laws by reference to children’s decision-making abilities. In-
 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 158, 158-61 (2013), which discusses how an understand-
ing of teenagers’ higher likelihood of risk taking should inform law but notes that current 
knowledge is not yet adequate for legal purposes. 
61. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988); see also Emily Buss, Developmental 
Jurisprudence, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 741, 742-46 (2016) (discussing the Court’s acceptance of de-
velopmental science). 
62. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79. 
63. Id. at 569-71. 
64. Id.; see also Kevin W. Saunders, The Role of Science in the Supreme Court’s Limitations on Juvenile 
Punishment, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 339, 349 (2013) (“More complex ‘executive’ functions of 
[the] prefrontal cortex such as reasoning, motivation, and judgment appear to develop grad-
ually during childhood and adolescence, perhaps continuing during the adult years.” (quoting 
Peter R. Huttenlocher & Arun S. Dabholkar, Regional Differences in Synaptogenesis in Human 
Cerebral Cortex, 387 J. COMP. NEUROLOGY 167, 178 (1997))). 
65. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-73; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68. 
66. See Appleton, supra note 9, at 526-27. For an example of a bright-line statute, see OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 43, § 3(A) (West 2016). 
67. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
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deed, the authorities framework provides no tools other than vague tests of “ma-
turity” for deciding when children will be subject to adult control and when they 
will be allowed to make their own decisions. 
In fact, the variable age of adulthood often reﬂects social and political con-
siderations other than, or in addition to, assumptions about children’s capacity 
for autonomous decision making.
68
 This was evident when the voting age was 
reduced to the draft age during the Vietnam War era,
69
 and it is evident now 
when some states prosecute children as adults while other states do not.
70
 In ad-
dition, in the context of delinquency and abortion, in particular, judicial and 
prosecutorial understandings of capacity and maturity may differ depending on 
the race, class, or gender of the children in question in ways that may reﬂect bias 
more than differing rates of development. One recent study found that adults 
view girls of color as less innocent and more adult-like than white girls, especially 
when they are between the ages of ﬁve and fourteen.
71
 Children of color are also 
transferred from juvenile to adult criminal court at higher rates than white chil-
dren.
72
 And, in addition to biases based on the identity of the children before 
them, it appears that judges sometimes invoke maturity to justify decisions 
rooted in impermissible value judgments. That is, children who make choices 
 
68. See LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE LAW: PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS 494 (2002) (“The age of 
majority is arbitrary not in the sense that it is unreasonable but in that it is variable from time 
to time and is often established to reﬂect some, but not all, levels of maturity and capacity.”); 
Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589, 
639-45 (2002) (comparing Bellotti and Parham and concluding that the “cases, and the broader 
category of children’s constitutional rights, become coherent when considered in terms of 
public health and sound social policy”); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Fem-
inist Approach to Children’s Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 5 (1986) (“[I]t is more honest to 
disclose that competence and incompetence are used here as proxies for a variety of concerns 
about what societal decision-makers think children may need, and about what they simulta-
neously think allows adults to choose for themselves.”). 
69. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1164 n.152 (1991) 
(stating that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s extension of “the franchise to eighteen-year-
olds grew out of the perceived unfairness of any gap between the Vietnam draft age and the 
voting age”). 
70. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE 
CRIMINALIZING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (2017). 
71. See Rebecca Epstein et al., Girlhood Interrupted: The Erasure of Black Girls’ Childhood, CTR. ON 
POVERTY & INEQ. 7-8 (2017), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes
/poverty-inequality/upload/girlhood-interrupted.pdf [http://perma.cc/8DGY-LBXG]. 
72. Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 CRIME & JUST. 81, 
102 (2000); see also Tamar R. Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the 
Defense Attorney, 58 B.C. L. REV. 379, 393-94 (2017). 
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with which judges disagree—choices to have sex, to drink, or to obtain an abor-
tion—may be more likely to be found “immature.”
73
 
The authorities framework therefore continues to focus largely on children’s 
dependency, with only a small and contradictory patchwork of laws extending 
negative liberties to older children. The framework legitimates and fortiﬁes the 
governing legal principles of parental rights and state parens patriae power. 
American courts, policymakers, and scholars accept this schema when determin-
ing how law governs or should govern children’s lives. Although often assumed 
to reﬂect the preexisting reality of children’s lives, the authorities framework is 
in fact a choice that shapes the lives of children and their parents. And, as set 
forth below, it does so in problematic ways. 
B. Why the Authorities Framework Fails 
Although many scholars have critiqued the public/private distinction that 
colors disputes between parents and the state,
74
 none have questioned whether 
authority is the proper lens through which to conceptualize the ﬁeld of children 
and law in the ﬁrst place. The narrow focus on children’s dependency under a 
regime of parental and state authority has multiple shortcomings. We focus on 
the four we believe to be most problematic: the failure to acknowledge and pro-
mote the richness of children’s lives in the here and now; an undue prioritization 
of parental rights over children’s interests; the ongoing perpetuation of the myth 
of nonintervention in the family; and a persistent reliance by legal actors on lim-
ited conceptions of both dependency and autonomy. 
1. Failure To Promote Children’s Interests in the Here and Now 
The authorities framework focuses on the developmental arc from depend-
ency to autonomy to the exclusion of other meaningful aspects of children’s lives. 
Under this narrow view, children as a class are always dependent on either par-
ents or the state, with courts and legislatures determining when some older ad-
olescents should be treated as rights-bearing autonomous adults. By focusing 
 
73. For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in determining whether a seventeen-year-old 
girl was sufficiently mature to refuse potentially life-saving cancer treatment, appears to have 
emphasized the girl’s lack of autonomous decision-making skills as a proxy for social disap-
proval of her desire to refuse treatment. In re Cassandra C., 112 A.3d 158, 171-72 (Conn. 2015). 
74. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 933 (1985); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and 
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). 
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solely on this trajectory from dependency to autonomy,
75
 the authorities frame-
work overlooks the fact that children enjoy active lives in the here and now, ex-
periencing a wide range of emotions and pursuing a variety of aims apart from 
their long-term investment in becoming adults. 
Although children are dependent on adults in many contexts and develop-
mental research is vital to any consideration of children and law, dependency and 
autonomy are not the only deﬁning facets of children’s lives—nor should they 
be. There is nothing innate or essential about children’s lives. Indeed, childhood 
itself is a social construction.
76
 It may be deﬁned in relation to development, 
other aspects of children’s experiences, or a combination thereof.
77
 Moreover, 
children’s experiences vary from child to child, are deeply situational, and change 
over time. The authorities framework fails to recognize this rich diversity be-
cause it ties children’s needs and interests to a baseline of adulthood, regarding 
 
75. Even scholars who seek to challenge the developmental focus of the authorities framework 
ultimately argue that children should have more autonomy within hierarchical relationships 
with parents, teachers, and state actors. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Child-
hood, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 715 (2013) (arguing that law should recognize children’s 
interests in self-government within such relationships, including within the privacy of the 
family). 
76. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 547 
(2000) (“American lawmakers have had relatively clear images of childhood and adulthood—
images that ﬁt with our conventional notions. Children are innocent beings, who are depend-
ent, vulnerable and incapable of making competent decisions.”); Barbara Bennett Wood-
house, Reframing the Debate About the Socialization of Children: An Environmentalist Paradigm, 
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 113 (“Modern scholars recognize that childhood is a culturally con-
structed idea, rather than a universal fact.”). For literature outside of law, see PHILIPPE ARIÈS, 
CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 15-33 (Robert Baldick trans., 
1962); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF 
CHILDREN 3-12 (1985); Allison James, Understanding Childhood from an Interdisciplinary Per-
spective, in RETHINKING CHILDHOOD 25, 28-29 (Peter B. Pufall & Richard P. Unsworth eds., 
2004); Alan Prout & Allison James, A New Paradigm for the Sociology of Childhood? Provenance, 
Promise and Problems, in CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: CONTEMPO-
RARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD 7, 8 (Allison James & Alan Prout 
eds., 1997); and Martin Woodhead, Psychology and the Cultural Construction of Children’s Needs, 
in CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD, supra, at 63, 63-68. 
77. In fact, the meaning of “childhood” shifts over time as it is constructed both structurally and 
through daily practice. For discussions of the shifting meanings of childhood over time in the 
United States, see CHILDHOOD IN AMERICA (Paula S. Fass & Mary Ann Mason eds., 2000); 
and HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REV-
OLUTION IN AUTHORITY 347-67 (2005). 
the new law of the child 
1469 
children as pre-adults, always in the act of becoming full persons but not neces-
sarily full persons in their own right.
78
 The authorities framework therefore per-
petuates a particular construction of childhood in which children may only es-
cape their dependency on adults by successfully developing into adults 
themselves. 
The ubiquitous “best interests of the child” standard, in its current conﬁgu-
ration,
79
  deepens rather than resolves these concerns about the authorities 
framework’s narrow view of children’s interests. Although the term “best inter-
ests” could encompass children’s interests broadly, the standard in practice has 
been coopted by the authorities framework’s developmental bent and has been 
frequently leveraged to protect parents’ ability to exercise proper authority over 
children. Further, the best interests standard often masks signiﬁcant judicial dis-
cretion.
80
 Legislatures and courts deﬁne a child’s best interests by the simple at-
tributes of age, gender, and other demographic factors or, in contrast, by refer-
ence to parents’ emotional health or wishes.
81
 The preference of the child is 
sometimes included as a factor in the determination, but this narrow focus on 
preference often elevates children’s stated desires over their other interests, 
 
78. This construction is pervasive in family law doctrine, see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 
(2000) (plurality opinion); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979), and scholarship, see, 
e.g., Buss, supra note 10, at 32; Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 482-
88 (2006); Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conﬂict, and the Socialization of Children, 91 CALIF. 
L. REV. 967, 1002-11 (2003); Scott, supra note 76, at 550-51, 589-98. This focus is present even 
in the work of scholars who are sympathetic to notions of children’s rights. See, e.g., John 
Eekelaar, The Importance of Thinking that Children Have Rights, in CHILDREN, RIGHTS AND THE 
LAW 221, 229-34 (Philip Alston et al. eds., 1992); Woodhouse, supra note 76, at 97-119. 
79. This standard appears in almost every area of law relating to children, but it surfaces most 
often in the areas of child custody and child welfare. For a thoughtful development of the 
“best interests of the child” standard in child protective proceedings, see Jean Koh Peters, The 
Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective 
Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505 (1996). 
80. See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 477, 479 (1984). 
81. For example, some custody statutes specify that the psychological state of the parents, the 
relative capacity of the parents and their interest in the child, the permanence of the home, 
and the presence of domestic violence are factors to be weighed in the decision-making pro-
cess. Connecticut lists a total of sixteen factors. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-54(f) (West 
2009). Other states with delineated factors include Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 403.270(2) (West 2017); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West 2002); and 
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137 (2015). 
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which remain largely unarticulated and unexamined. Moreover, the child’s pref-
erence is considered as a single factor, which is often trumped by the recognition 
of parental rights.
82
 
The traditional best interests standard therefore does not address children’s 
interests as persons in their own right. The standard has little discernible content 
and often operates as a mask for judicial discretion. To the extent it does have 
substance, the standard’s conception of “best interests” tends to be deﬁned in 
relation to children’s developmental needs and parental rights. Children’s inter-
ests beyond dependency and autonomy remain largely unarticulated and unex-
amined. 
2. Undue Prioritization of Parental Rights 
A foundational commitment to parental rights undergirds the authorities 
framework, limiting law’s ability to recognize and further children’s interests be-
yond dependency and autonomy. Under the authorities framework, parents en-
joy rights over their children as part of the fundamental due process right to 
choose how to live their lives free from governmental control.
83
 Notably, paren-
tal rights are doctrinally rooted in parents’ own autonomy interests, not in their 
responsibility for furthering children’s interests, broadly construed. Although 
some contemporary scholars argue that strong enforcement of parental rights is 
the best way to serve children’s interests,
84
 the interests served are narrowly de-
ﬁned and typically not at the forefront of the decision-making process. 
Indeed, when parental rights come into play, children’s interests generally 
drop out of the equation altogether. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., for example, a 
biological father claimed that California’s presumption of paternity—which as-
signed paternal rights to the husband of a married woman over the biological 
father—was unconstitutional.
85
 The Supreme Court held that a biological father 
does not have constitutionally-recognized parental rights to a relationship with 
a child when the mother is married to another man. More importantly, the Court 
rejected the child’s claim to a relationship with her biological father, viewing the 
biological father’s right and the child’s interests as two sides of the same coin.
86
 
If the biological father could not assert a right to maintain a relationship with his 
 
82. For other critiques of the best interests standard, see Chambers, supra note 80; and Jon Elster, 
Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
83. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. 
84. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 13, at 636. 
85. 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1988). 
86. Id. at 130-31. 
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child, the Court reasoned, then the child had no parallel cognizable interest in a 
relationship with him.
87
 
Parental rights often receive controlling weight, decentering and devaluing 
children in legal analyses. For example, in Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court 
rejected a Washington State statute that allowed courts to grant visitation rights 
to third parties over the objection of custodial parents if that “visitation may 
serve the best interests of the child.”
88
 At the center of the dispute in Troxel were 
two young girls whose father had committed suicide. The paternal grandpar-
ents, who had a close relationship with the girls, sought visitation rights beyond 
the monthly visits the mother was willing to allow. The plurality opinion written 
by Justice O’Connor held that the statute violated parents’ rights to “the care, 
custody, and control of their children.”
89
 In this context, O’Connor concluded, 
the mother’s rights prevailed over any consideration of the children’s interests in 
maintaining closer contact with their grandparents—the primary link to their 
deceased father and important ﬁgures in the children’s lives. 
Although parental rights may indirectly further children’s interests, they are 
a circuitous and unreliable means of doing so. Parental rights construct children 
predominantly as objects of control, rather than as people with values and inter-
ests of their own. Indeed, in face-offs between parental rights and children’s 
rights, parents almost always win. In both Michael H. and Troxel, for example, 
the Supreme Court majorities did not take children’s interests into account in 
any meaningful way. Parental rights maintain their hold on the American legal 
imagination, even as many parents are overwhelmed by the demands of an ex-
pansive and exclusive notion of parental childrearing authority and rely on oth-
ers to help perform childrearing duties.
90
 
All this is not to say that parental rights should play no role in children’s lives. 
Parental rights may foster pluralism and diversity among families, protecting 
children from state standardization and indoctrination.
91
 They also clearly fur-
ther parents’ own interests in raising their children free from governmental con-
trol. They promote children’s interests in developing and maintaining close, sta-
ble attachment relationships with caregivers, particularly in the early years. And 
 
87. Id. 
88. 530 U.S. at 60. 
89. Id. at 65. 
90. See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and 
Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 390 (2008). 
91. See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 958-59 
(1993); Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV. 
L. REV. 1348, 1371 (1994). 
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ﬁnally, parental rights serve children’s interests because parents often know what 
is best for their children. Yet under the authorities framework, parental rights 
have had an outsized inﬂuence, overshadowing conﬂicts within the family as 
well as alternative ways of supporting children’s interests. Indeed, many U.S. 
policymakers have opposed ratiﬁcation of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
the Child speciﬁcally on the ground that the treaty would undermine parental 
authority.
92
 The United States, in contrast to almost every other country in the 
world,
93
 continues to overprioritize parental rights at the expense of children’s 
interests. 
3. Perpetuation of the Myth of Nonintervention in the Family 
The authorities framework’s strong emphasis on parental rights also perpet-
uates a myth of nonintervention in the family and particularly in children’s 
lives—a myth that does not accurately describe family life and that stands in the 
way of developing a robust regime of parental responsibilities to children.
94
 Un-
der the authorities framework, common-law and constitutional notions of fam-
ily privacy assign parents control over their children unless and until the state 
 
92. See, e.g., Shulamit Almog & Ariel L. Bendor, The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Meets 
the American Constitution: Towards a Supreme Law of the World, 11 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 273, 277 
(2004). 
93. The United States is currently the only U.N. member state that has not ratiﬁed the Conven-
tion, as South Sudan and Somalia ratiﬁed the Convention in recent years. See Hailing Somalia’s 
Ratiﬁcation, UN Renews Call for Universalization of Child Rights Treaty, UN NEWS CTR.  
(Oct. 2, 2015), http://news.un.org/en/story/2015/10/511312-hailing-somalias-ratiﬁcation-un 
-renews-call-universalization-child-rights [http://perma.cc/ZRJ8-RJJ5]; UN Lauds South 
Sudan as Country Ratiﬁes Landmark Child Rights Treaty, UN NEWS CTR. (May 4, 2015), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50759#.WcewrkyZNE4 [http://perma
.cc/EBB7-NDK5]. 
94. Some scholars rightly focus less on parental rights and more on parental and state duties to 
care for children. See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 13, at 2415; Soo Jee Lee, Note, A Child’s 
Voice vs. a Parent’s Control: Resolving a Tension Between the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and U.S. Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 690 (2017). These scholars argue for the importance 
of recognizing and developing law’s treatment of children—particularly young children—as 
vulnerable individuals in need of support, care, and protection. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, 
A World Fit for Children Is a World Fit for Everyone: Ecogenerism, Feminism, and Vulnerability, 
46 HOUS. L. REV. 817, 820 (2009). Although framed in terms of children’s welfare and adult 
duties to children, the attention to hierarchical relationships of control continues unabated, 
as does the question of which adults—parents or the state—carry responsibilities for children. 
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intervenes.
95
 Such privacy is commonly understood to place families—and chil-
dren—beyond the reach of law.
96
 In fact, it is conventional wisdom to assume 
that law is irrelevant to children unless they are subject to a state’s abuse and 
neglect jurisdiction, have been adjudicated delinquent, or are involved in custody 
proceedings. 
Despite this narrative of nonintervention, law in fact regulates children’s lives 
on a daily basis. The authorities framework generally renders this regulation in-
visible, but two modes of analysis bring it to light: ﬁrst, an examination of the 
law affecting children’s lives outside of the traditional domain of the authorities 
framework; and second, an examination of the ways in which decisions not to 
regulate do in fact have regulatory effects. 
First, the ﬁeld of children and law currently considers only some of the laws 
affecting children’s lives. For example, a leading casebook organizes law’s regu-
lation of children by type of authority and location, with parental authority gov-
erning in the home and state parens patriae authority governing in schools and 
in the juvenile justice system.
97
 But law mediates children’s interactions with 
multiple actors in multiple spheres across public and private divides. For exam-
ple, law often dictates when children may work for wages, when they may enter 
into enforceable contracts, how they may access social media, to which adver-
tisements they may be subject, how they may manage property, when they must 
be vaccinated, what they must waive to participate in sports and other activities, 
 
95. These notions of privacy go beyond individual parental rights to encompass the family as a 
whole. See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 91, at 963 (“[S]ince the early part of this century, the family 
has been accorded independent constitutional protection independent of the liberties enjoyed 
by its individual members.”); Martha Albertson Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Fam-
ily: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955, 966 (1991) (“The common law privacy doc-
trine is not an individualized concept . . . : it attaches to the entity of the family, not to the 
individuals that compose it.”). For further discussion of the interplay between constitutional 
and common-law notions of family privacy, see Rosenbury, supra note 10, at 864-67. 
96. Indeed, Bruce Hafen has described such privacy as “plenary,” meaning parental power “pre-
vail[s] over the claims of the state, other outsiders, and the children themselves unless there 
is some compelling justiﬁcation for interference.” Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the 
New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” 1976 BYU L. 
REV. 605, 617. Of course, such privacy is not enjoyed by all families equally. See, e.g., Dorothy 
Roberts, The Dialectic of Privacy and Punishment in the Gendered Regulation of Parenting, 5 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 191, 200 (2009); Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizen-
ship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563, 1580-81 (1996) (reviewing LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTI-
TLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE (1994); and JILL QUADAGNO, THE 
COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994)). 
97. HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 68, at 3-4. For another leading casebook, see DOUGLAS E. 
ABRAMS ET AL., CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY AND PRACTICE (6th ed. 2017). 
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and how daycares and summer camps must be structured.
98
 When these broader 
forms of regulation are taken into account, we see that law mediates children’s 
experiences on a daily and ongoing basis, even if most children and their families 
never end up in court. By failing to offer a satisfying account of the legal regula-
tion of children’s lives apart from their involvement in hierarchical relationships 
of control with parents and state actors, the authorities framework obscures 
these other forms of regulation. In doing so, it perpetuates the myth that law 
generally does not affect children’s lives and that, when it does, it is largely a 
subset of family law. 
Second, the authorities framework fails to fully examine the effects of its my-
opic focus on the hierarchical parent-child relationship. The authorities frame-
work posits the parent-child relationship and parental authority as natural and 
preexisting, with law entering the relationship only when courts or government 
agencies explicitly intervene. Yet both the recognition of the parent-child rela-
tionship and the grant of parental rights are state decisions.
99
 Parental authority 
also ﬂows from laws specifying that children lack the legal capacity to make most 
decisions on their own.
100
 Parental rights and family privacy are therefore always 
already “constituted and regulated by law, even if what is constituted includes a 
domain of autonomous judgment that can come into conﬂict with law.”
101
 In 
other words, a state’s decision not to regulate most parent-child relationships is 
itself a form of regulation. By respecting parental rights and family privacy, law 
touches every child’s life. This involvement constructs children as objects of pa-
rental control. By failing to recognize such regulation, the authorities framework 
perpetuates the myth that the law does not intervene in children’s lives, both 
inaccurately describing family life and limiting the potential of law to better serve 
children’s interests. 
 
98. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 9, at 526-28; Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: To-
wards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. 
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 287 (2006); Rosenbury, supra note 10, at 833-34; Jonathan Todres, 
Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1109-10 (2012). 
99. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN 
LAW 276 (1990) (“Rather than marking a boundary limiting state intervention in the family, 
laws governing the family deﬁne the kinds of families the state approves.”); Dailey, supra note 
91, at 1000. 
100. See Minow, supra note 68, at 4. 
101. JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY 352 (1994). 
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4. Reliance on Limited Conceptions of Dependency and Autonomy 
Finally, the authorities framework fails on its own terms to the extent it em-
braces limited conceptions of dependency and autonomy. Its consistent focus on 
children as developing persons produces a system premised on a greater degree 
of dependency than children may actually experience.
102
 Moreover, some forms 
of children’s dependency are direct consequences of the law, forcing children to 
rely on their parents when they otherwise might not. For example, because chil-
dren generally are not permitted to engage in wage labor
103
 or to consent to med-
ical care,
104
 they are dependent on adults to perform those functions for them. 
In this respect, a child’s legal status as a “child” overrides all other potentially 
relevant individualized factors, like the actual age, maturity, or dependency of 
the particular child.
105
 
Here it may be useful to consider how law has both addressed and con-
structed dependency in other contexts. Disability, for example, is an apparently 
objective condition that nonetheless has been shaped by the law’s ability-disa-
bility binary in profound ways.
106
 An impairment is constructed as a disability 
only against law’s assessment of what it means to be “able-bodied.” Marital sta-
tus, too, once constructed dependency by conferring virtually all legal rights on 
husbands, purportedly for the beneﬁt and protection of wives.
107
 Although this 
legal regime was, in part, a response to dependencies arising from childbearing 
and childrearing, that response also shaped perceptions of women’s abilities both 
 
102. See BARRIE THORNE, GENDER PLAY: GIRLS AND BOYS IN SCHOOL 3 (1993) (“[T]he concept of 
‘socialization’ moves mostly in one direction. Adults are said to socialize children, teachers 
socialize students, the more powerful socialize, and the less powerful get socialized. Power, 
indeed, is central to all these relationships, but children, students, the less powerful are by no 
means passive or without agency.”). 
103. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
104. Children generally need their parents’ consent for medical care, although exceptions have 
been made in the context of “mature minors,” as well as the treatment of alcoholism, drug 
addiction, sexually transmitted diseases, and other similar contexts. See, e.g., Jennifer L. 
Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minors Have a Right To Make Decisions Regarding 
Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1996); Walter Wadlington, Medical Deci-
sion Making for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 
311. 
105. See Minow, supra note 68; Minow, supra note 13. 
106. See generally Bradley A. Areheart, Disability Trouble, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347 (2011). 
107. See Note, To Have and To Hold: The Marital Rape Exception and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 n.11 (1986) (“Before the passage of the Married Women’s Property 
Acts, a married woman was unable to sue or be sued, enter into contracts, make wills, retain 
her own earnings, or manage her own property.”). 
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in and out of the home. By virtue of law, women were thought to lack the con-
stitution to work long hours in factories and the capacity to vote. It took centu-
ries for courts and legislatures to reject these limitations as legal and social con-
structs not reﬂective of real differences between men and women.
108
 Today, the 
law of marriage and divorce continues to respond to the dependencies of 
childbearing and childrearing, but in a way that better reﬂects the coexistence of 
dependence and autonomy with respect to both spouses.
109
 
Children’s dependencies, of course, are much more a function of biological 
age or maturity than are the dependencies of spouses or people with disabilities. 
At birth, children are completely dependent on adults, and only over time do 
they acquire the mental and physical capabilities to pursue more independent 
courses of action. Yet the dependency of infants and young children masks im-
portant aspects of children’s experiences that are not controlled by their devel-
opmental status. And by relying on a one-dimensional understanding of chil-
dren as either dependent or autonomous beings, the authorities framework fails 
to recognize and value children’s capacities as agents of their own lives even at 
relatively young ages.
110
 
The authorities framework also offers an impoverished conception of auton-
omy. Under that framework, autonomy acts as an on-off switch, obscuring the 
fact that certain capacities for independent thought and action—what we might 
call “agency”—often exist alongside dependency.
111
 Consider an especially stark 
example: the case of a young adolescent girl who herself becomes a mother. In 
most states, she will be considered a dependent vis-à-vis her own parents—with-
out power, for example, to make educational decisions for herself. But she will 
nevertheless likely have parental control over healthcare decisions for her baby. 
Similarly, children might have strongly held views about bodily privacy or about 
their choice of friends in school, despite being dependent on their parents in 
other ways. The authorities framework leaves little room for law to develop a 
 
108. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
1, 2. 
109. See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways To End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. 
REV. 1227 (discussing the partnership theory of marriage). 
110. See THORNE, supra note 102, at 3; Prout & James, supra note 76, at 8; Buss, supra note 10, at 
34. 
111. Scott, supra note 76, at 547; see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent 
Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1627 (1992) (discussing the scientiﬁc evidence on ado-
lescent decision-making competence). 
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vision of children’s agency within multidimensional relationships of which their 
dependency is only one small part.
112
 
Moreover, autonomy as a basis for children’s rights goes only so far. The au-
thorities framework presumes that autonomous decision making is the precon-
dition for children’s rights. In this way, the framework deﬁnes children’s rights 
just as constitutional law deﬁnes adult rights—as negative liberties protecting a 
sphere of autonomous decision-making.
113
 So long as children are treated as de-
pendents, they are presumptively excluded from the class of rights-holders.
114
 
The authorities framework thus fails to acknowledge an alternative, positive 
conception of rights better suited to furthering children’s unique interests as chil-
dren. This exclusive focus on negative liberty provides yet another reason why 
the United States remains the only member nation not to ratify the U.N. Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child,
115
 a treaty granting children affirmative 
rights to certain fundamental goods such as healthcare, education, and housing. 
Notably missing from the authorities framework, then, is any robust, com-
prehensive vision of children’s affirmative rights. At the state level, children may 
claim the right to education, but not much else.
116
 Almost all governmental 
goods and services are governmental beneﬁts—as opposed to entitlements—ex-
tended at the discretion of the state.
117
 The authorities framework’s equation of 
rights with autonomy excludes children’s affirmative claims to maintain certain 
relationships or to receive certain services and goods to secure their present and 
future well-being. In fact, the Supreme Court has made it exceedingly clear that 
the U.S. Constitution confers no affirmative entitlements on children,
118
 a posi-
tion directly at odds with the broader interests of children set forth in Part II and 
the new framework we propose in Part III. 
 
112. At the same time, the authorities framework also fails to recognize the dependency of adults. 
See Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 2181, 2182 (1995). 
113. American constitutional law remains strongly wedded to the view that the Constitution is a 
charter of negative liberties, bestowing few positive rights on anyone—adults or children. As 
Anne Alstott writes, “So strong is the Court’s ideal of negative liberty, and so extreme is its 
skepticism about state power, that it has insulated the state from any responsibility to protect 
children—even against vicious and foreseeable parental attacks.” Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism 
in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 25 (2014). 
114. See DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 54 (2d ed. 2004); JAMES G. DWYER, 
THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 291-92 (2006); THEORIES OF RIGHTS (Jeremy Wal-
dron ed., 1984). 
115. See supra note 93. 
116. See infra text accompanying notes 172-174. 
117. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 113, at 41-42. 
118. Id.; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
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* * * 
The authorities framework does more than fail to reﬂect certain features of 
children’s lives; it also shapes children’s lives by signaling that aspects of their 
lives beyond dependency and autonomy are, or should be, unimportant to chil-
dren, parents, and the state. The authorities framework therefore constitutes 
children as lesser adults, leading to a legal regime grounded in a distorted vision 
of children’s lives, parental rights, and the potential for state support of families. 
As we explain in the next Part, law can and should expand its conception of 
children’s interests beyond dependency and autonomy. While children are di-
verse in many ways, they share relational interests beyond hierarchical relation-
ships of control. All children have present, noninstrumental interests, desires, 
experiences, and needs. By moving beyond the authorities framework’s short-
comings, a broader conception of children’s lives in the here and now comes into 
view. 
i i .  children’s interests in the here and now 
The new law of the child set forth in the rest of this Article demonstrates why 
law should, as a prescriptive matter, regulate children’s lives based on a clearly 
articulated, broad range of children’s interests. Our analysis is powered by a vi-
sion of children living meaningful lives in the here and now—a vision drawn 
from developmental literature, scholarship on children and law, and what we 
take to be the best of judicial decision making. Children’s lives encompass an 
array of experiences outside the developmental trajectory that moves children 
from dependency to autonomy. This Part identiﬁes these broader, more inclusive 
interests, specifying the nuanced ways in which they intersect with—but often 
transcend—dependency and autonomy concerns. 
This Part identiﬁes ﬁve fundamental interests that we believe best capture 
children’s experience in the here and now. These are children’s interests in: (1) 
parental and nonparental relationships; (2) exposure to new ideas; (3) expres-
sions of identity; (4) personal integrity and privacy; and (5) participation in civic 
life. These ﬁve interests are not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to serve as a 
starting point for further inquiry by courts, legislatures, and scholars. We are 
cognizant of the fact that any compilation of children’s interests cannot be deﬁn-
itive or absolute. What we present here is a provisional account, open to debate 
and revision. By setting forth our best rendering of children’s broader interests, 
we hope to stimulate that debate. 
The discussion that follows acknowledges and embraces diversity among 
children. Children’s interests vary from child to child, are deeply situational, and 
change with the passage of time. The authorities framework’s narrow focus on 
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parental rights and children’s dependency has prevented law from more fully at-
tending to children’s differences. Parental rights in particular, while justiﬁed in 
part on the ground that freedom from governmental control will promote family 
diversity and social pluralism,
119
 reinforce a norm of governmental noninterven-
tion that prevents law from recognizing differing needs and privileges among 
children. Children’s economic, racial, religious, gender, and other differences are 
lost under a legal framework designed to promote adult authority over all else. 
Our approach, in contrast, resists the impulse to essentialize children or parents, 
instead acknowledging the diverse ways children experience the interests we 
identify. 
In articulating children’s broader interests in the here and now, this Part lays 
the foundation for a radical reworking of the ﬁeld of children and law while also 
reinvigorating existing standards. As explained in Part I, the authorities frame-
work’s narrow conception of children’s interests has produced a weak and largely 
ineffectual “best interests of the child” standard that typically gives way in the 
face of parental rights. Our approach aims to transform the best interests stand-
ard into a robust mechanism for evaluating and weighing children’s broader in-
terests in legislative, administrative, and judicial decision making, with parental 
rights coming into play only to the extent that they advance those interests in a 
particular case.
120
 Thus we retain the phrase “best interests standard” as a useful 
legal term that allows for balancing children’s broad interests in the context of 
legislative, administrative, and judicial decision making. 
Our account of children’s lives resonates to some extent with the work of 
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit in their path-breaking 1973 
book, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.
121
 Like their approach to child custody 
“from the child’s vantage point,”
122
 our new law of the child seeks to go “beyond” 
the existing categories of autonomy and dependency to capture the richness, di-
versity, and uniqueness of children’s experience as children. Although Goldstein, 
Freud, and Solnit importantly focused on children’s emotional connections to 
 
119. See supra note 91. 
120. Our approach shares certain attributes with the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
However, the Convention—while focused on children’s broad interests—makes no attempt to 
reconcile competing concerns, to organize children’s interests into a coherent framework, or 
to explain how the application of the rights it conveys would be operationalized. Moreover, 
the Convention stays exclusively within a rights framework, whereas our approach promotes 
children’s interests more broadly. Nevertheless, the new law of the child is in harmony with 
the U.N. Convention, and we would support ratiﬁcation of the treaty by the United States. 
121. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD (1973). 
122. Id. at 49. 
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others in light of children’s sense of time and perspective on the world, they re-
mained tied to a theory of development that emphasized children’s relationship 
with their “psychological parent” above all others.
123
 The new law of the child 
aims to revive Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s child-centered, psychologically at-
tuned perspective while at the same time recognizing the value of children’s var-
ying relationships and experiences. Ultimately, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit did 
not break free of the authorities framework’s emphasis on parents’ rights as the 
touchstone for children and the law. It is precisely this paradigmatic centering of 
parental control that our new law of the child leaves behind. 
We thus seek to directly promote the diversity of children’s broader interests 
without sacriﬁcing core legal protections for parental rights and family privacy. 
This Part ﬁrst sets out the normative foundation for the recognition of these 
broader interests and then examines each of the ﬁve interests in turn. 
A. Normative Foundations 
Our vision of children’s broader interests embodies prescriptive goals for 
children’s lives under the law. We seek to better capture who children are in an 
empirical sense, but we also aim to build a normative account of children under 
the law. The new law of the child is attentive to parental rights and the develop-
mental needs of children, while also focusing on children’s distinct abilities, 
needs, and experiences as children. In particular, our approach recognizes and 
promotes children’s capacities to develop relationships; explore the world of 
ideas; express their identities; feel secure in their bodily integrity and personal 
privacy; and be fulﬁlled through work and political engagement. 
This elaboration of broader interests breaks free from the limitations of the 
authorities framework we identiﬁed in Part I. In addition to promoting children’s 
broader interests, we draw attention to law’s involvement in all dimensions of 
family life, beginning with legal deﬁnitions of childhood and the assignment of 
children to their biological parents’ custody. The elaboration of children’s 
broader interests also eschews easy binaries such as the dependency-autonomy 
polarity that currently structures the authorities framework. We emphasize that 
children experience agency within dependency, while acknowledging that chil-
dren’s present interests are always ﬁltered through the lens of their future lives 
as adults. 
To that end, we acknowledge the difficulty of labeling the interests we wish 
to promote. In many ways, they may be described as children’s present interests in 
contrast to the developmental interests at the core of the authorities framework. 
 
123. See id. at 17-20. 
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Children have interests as children, separate from and in addition to their inter-
est in developing into autonomous adults.
124
 At the same time, describing these 
interests as present interests risks setting up a false binary between present and 
future interests. Children, like adults, experience the present while looking to-
ward the future.
125
 They experience a range of emotions and pursue a range of 
purposes, some of which are related to the concerns and aspirations of their fu-
ture selves as they are imagined in the present. By emphasizing that children’s 
present and future interests are inextricably linked, the new law of the child helps 
to unseat the prevailing dependency-autonomy binary, whereby children are 
viewed either as dependent on adults or as autonomous individuals nearing 
adulthood. 
We thus refer to the broad range of children’s interests presented in this Part 
as children’s “broader interests” or “interests in the here and now.” Of course, 
children’s developmental needs and experiences—their interest in becoming fu-
ture adults—are not excluded from our analysis. But, while developmental con-
cerns are relevant and should be taken into account, adult autonomy is not the 
endpoint of the analysis nor the only foundation for children’s rights. We there-
fore distinguish our analysis from that of commentators emphasizing children’s 
right to an “open future.”
126
 These commentators focus on eliminating barriers 
to children’s future choices as adults, but they fail to recognize that children also 
have robust interests in the here and now, well before those futures are realized. 
Our account of children’s broader interests aligns with fundamental commit-
ments and aspirations already embedded in American law and legal discourse. 
 
124. See, e.g., CHRIS JENKS, CHILDHOOD 32-51 (1996). 
125. In fact, given existing social and legal conceptions of childhood, it would be impossible for 
children to experience the present without regard to their future as adults because their very 
classiﬁcation as children is deﬁned against that eventual status. See, e.g., Leena Alanen, Gen-
erational Order, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF CHILDHOOD STUDIES 159 (Jens Qvortrup, 
William A. Corsaro & Michael-Sebastian Honig eds., 2009); Maria Grahn-Farley, A Theory of 
Child Rights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 867, 871-74 (2003). 
126. See, e.g., Dena S. Davis, The Child’s Right to an Open Future: Yoder and Beyond, 26 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 93 (1997); John Eekelaar, The Emergence of Children’s Rights, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
161, 170 (1986) (arguing that children’s rights should reﬂect the idea that children’s “capacities 
are to be developed to their best advantage”); Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Fu-
ture, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 
125-26 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980) (identifying children’s “rights-in-trust” 
or “anticipatory autonomy rights,” deﬁned as a child’s right “to have . . . future options kept 
open until he is a fully formed self-determining adult capable of deciding among them”). 
Justice Douglas, in his famous dissent in Yoder, foreshadowed these “future rights” theories 
when he proclaimed that “the future of the student” was imperiled by the majority’s decision 
to allow the Amish to keep their children out of school beyond the sixth grade. Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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Recognition of the central value of intimate relationships in human affairs has a 
long history in constitutional law and commentary.
127
 Law has come to deﬁne 
the sphere of adult intimate relationships in terms of parenting, sexuality, and 
marriage; this normative understanding of relationships as central to human 
ﬂourishing applies equally if not more so to children. Similarly, children’s inter-
est in exposure to new ideas resonates with many of the same values underlying 
adults’ rights to free expression and access to ideas.
128
 Adult interests in bodily 
integrity and personal privacy—interests that children share—are also an estab-
lished ﬁxture of American law.
129
 And the right to participate in civic life, most 
notably through voting, has a long, albeit contested, history in which children 
can and should be recognized.
130
 
To be clear, we do not simply seek to transfer a regime of adult liberal values 
to children. Our normative account of children’s interests goes well beyond an 
understanding of the core values that animate law’s regulation of persons more 
generally. The governing liberal ideal for adults—the principle of individual au-
tonomy—plays a lesser role in our scheme of children’s interests. In contrast to 
 
127. Beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court has focused 
on the realm of intimate relationships as a core protected sphere under the Due Process 
Clause. Commentators, too, have offered a normative defense of a right of intimate association 
under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 
89 YALE L. J. 624, 629-37 (1980). More recently, the Court has recognized the right of same-
sex couples to engage in sexual activity, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and to 
marry, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). And parental rights, while protecting 
a realm of adult authority, also reﬂect the value of intimate relationships in adult life. See Buss, 
supra note 13, at 655-56. 
128. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the 
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”); Lamont v. Postmaster 
Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It would be a barren marketplace 
of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the 
Right To Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 4; William E. Lee, The Supreme Court and the Right To 
Receive Expression, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 323-26. 
129. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Jed Ruben-
feld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 783-99 (1989); see also Cruzan v. Director, 
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding a state law requiring clear and convinc-
ing evidence of a patient’s wishes for removal of life support). 
130. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating a statute that 
limited voting rights based on taxable real property owners and parents or guardians of chil-
dren enrolled in public schools); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (ﬁnding 
a state poll tax unconstitutional); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that two 
proposals to apportion seats in the state legislature violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause); see also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CON-
TESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000) (describing the role of shifting 
ideologies in contestations over the right to vote in the United States). 
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the authorities framework’s focus on children’s attainment of autonomy, we en-
vision children’s lives freed from the ideal of the autonomous, freely acting adult 
individual. We elaborate a new law of the child that better reﬂects the full 
breadth of children’s experiences in the here and now, as children and not simply 
as future autonomous adults. Some of these interests resonate with the interests 
of adults, but some are distinct to children’s interests. 
The new law of the child thus exposes an unresolved conundrum within tra-
ditional liberal theory: how to account for the interests of children under a legal 
regime organized around the fundamental principle of individual autonomy.
131
 
Our approach pushes the liberal legal framework to its limits—or even beyond—
by insisting that children’s interests be given priority over adult autonomy 
rights.
132
 We also break free from a single-minded devotion to a choice frame-
work of rights rooted in the liberal legal ideal of individual autonomy. Older ad-
olescents may lay claim to modiﬁed autonomy rights—what we call agency 
rights—but autonomy is not the central concern under our new law of the child. 
Instead, we aim to tie children’s rights to adult responsibilities, opening up ave-
nues for recognizing children’s affirmative entitlements to certain goods, ser-
vices, and access to ideas and people in their lives. 
Our new framework thus seeks to build a different normative account of chil-
dren’s lives that gives rise to new ways of imagining the law’s regulation of chil-
dren. This normative account will be contested; we aim here only to open a dia-
logue rather than to impose a ﬁnal, authoritative statement of children’s 
treatment in law. Nevertheless, the framework we offer is more than simply one 
alternative among many for promoting the interests of children. The new law of 
the child represents our best attempt to engender a legal regime that values chil-
dren as full persons with broad interests and rights of their own. 
 
131. Rawlsian liberal theorists might argue that the parties in the original position were all once 
children themselves, and therefore children’s interests are taken into account vicariously. But 
these parties were children in the past; the theory does not explain why they would take chil-
dren’s interests into account in the here and now. Rawls himself appears to have excluded chil-
dren from the original position. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 183 (rev. ed. 1999) 
(describing paternalism as the responsibility to “[c]hoose for others as we have reason to be-
lieve they would choose for themselves if they were at the age of reason and deciding ration-
ally”). 
132. Our new law of the child might be understood as a reform of classic liberalism or a rejection 
altogether—an issue we do not resolve here. For an effort to reform classic liberal theory, see 
ANNE ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES 
PARENTS 75-100, 141-52 (2004); and Dailey, supra note 13. Cf. Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy 
to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 805 (1999) (“It 
remains an open question whether the feminist inﬂuences I describe will, in fact, ‘reconstruct’ 
liberal autonomy, or transform it into something else altogether.”). 
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B. Children’s Five Broader Interests 
The new law of the child expands law’s reach to incorporate a broader range 
of interests in the here and now beyond the dependency and autonomy interests 
already recognized by law. As already explained, these broader interests encom-
pass developmental needs and goals, as children’s present well-being cannot be 
neatly separated from their future aims. We identify and discuss ﬁve interests: 
(1) parental and nonparental relationships; (2) exposure to new ideas; (3) ex-
pressions of identity; (4) personal integrity and privacy; and (5) participation in 
civic life. These ﬁve broader interests are offered here in the spirit of opening a 
more focused and sustained dialogue over the present and future well-being of 
children. 
1. Parental and Nonparental Relationships 
Our approach recognizes the importance of children developing a primary 
attachment relationship with at least one adult committed to their care over 
time.
133
 Young children need emotional security and care to ensure their well-
being and development, and the parent-child relationship is the ﬁrst and pri-
mary attachment relationship in most children’s lives. Ideally, parental or other 
custodial caregivers provide the conditions most likely to produce basic loving 
environments for children.
134
 These attachment relationships have the potential 
to foster children’s pleasure and propel their development in physical, emotional, 
and cognitive ways. 
Law already vigorously protects the parent-child relationship,
135
 yet it does 
so by consistently placing children at the bottom of the vertical parent-child re-
 
133. See, e.g, ATTACHMENT THEORY AND RESEARCH: NEW DIRECTIONS AND EMERGING THEMES 
(Jeffrey A. Simpson & W. Stephen Rholes eds., 2015); GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra 
note 121 (developing “psychological parent” theory based on attachment theory). 
134. Some argue that parents and the state together have the responsibility to ensure that every 
child be loved. See, e.g., Luara Ferracioli, The State’s Duty To Ensure Children Are Loved, 8 J. 
ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 15-18 (2014); see also Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Relational Rights of 
Children, 48 CONN. L. REV. 741, 795-801 (2016) (arguing that the state should recognize a 
variety of caregiver-child relationships). 
135. See supra Part I (critiquing family law’s orientation towards authority over the child). 
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lationship, thus focusing primarily on children’s developmental needs and inter-
ests.
136
 This emphasis on hierarchical relationships undervalues the relation-
ships children form with other children, including siblings and peers, as well as 
with noncustodial adults in their lives. 
We value the parent-child relationship while also emphasizing that parents 
are not the only important persons in children’s lives. Developmental researchers 
study the ways in which “[y]oung children experience their world as an envi-
ronment of relationships, and these relationships affect virtually all aspects of 
their development.”
137
 Many relationships in children’s lives are not deﬁned by a 
legal right to control, as the parent-child relationship is, yet these diverse rela-
tionships are important to children’s development. Other relationships are not 
necessarily tied to children’s dependency or developmental needs, but they none-
theless play important roles in children’s lives. 
With a focus on children’s broader range of relationships, the new law of the 
child positions children as more than passive recipients of adult childrearing. 
Rather than placing children at the bottom of hierarchical relationships of con-
trol, the new law of the child positions children as active participants at the cen-
ter of a web of multiple relationships, including those with other adults, siblings, 
and peers. 
a. Relationships with Other Adults 
Many children live with adults who are not their legal parents, and all chil-
dren interact with a diverse group of adults. Law currently recognizes the value 
of these relationships with other adults only to the extent that the adults are ful-
ﬁlling a caregiving role similar to parents.
138
 Stepparents, unmarried partners of 
 
136. See Rosenbury, supra note 10, at 833-34 (observing the “general principle” in family law that 
“absent abuse or other forms of perceived family default, parents enjoy almost complete au-
thority over their children at home, whereas the state may exercise authority over children at 
school,” and thus “[w]ith limited exceptions, children have few rights in either realm”). 
137. Nat’l Sci. Council on the Developing Child, Young Children Develop in an Environment of Re-
lationships 1 (Harvard Ctr. on the Developing Child, Working Paper 1, 2004). 
138. Beginning in the 1980s, family law scholars embarked on a law reform project designed to 
expand legal notions of the family to include all groups functioning as families even if they 
did not enjoy family status. For examples, see Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Fam-
ilies: Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 287-88 (1992); Martha Minow, 
Redeﬁning Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 270-72 (1991); Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a Communitarian 
Theory of the “Nontraditional” Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 576-84; and Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family Law, 69 TEX. L. REV. 245, 279-80 (1990). Ac-
cordingly, states have increasingly recognized “de facto” parents as family members. See, e.g., 
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legal parents, and a limited number of other adults playing caregiving roles in 
children’s lives may therefore enjoy parent-like rights so long as they continue to 
function like parents.
139
 
These relationships, while meaningful to many families, reinforce the im-
portance of parental bonds to the exclusion of children’s other relationships with 
adults.
140
 Under the authorities framework, children’s relationships with indi-
viduals other than their parents are fully within their parents’ control. Because 
children are always within the custody of parents or the state, their relationships 
are always controlled by their custodians. Parents largely determine children’s 
access to grandparents, former foster parents, paid caregivers, and even some 
noncustodial biological parents.
 141
 
 
Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family: Changing Realities of Parenthood: 
The Law’s Response to the Evolving American Family and Emerging Reproductive Technologies, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 2052, 2054-64 (2003); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DIS-
SOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(c) (2002) (deﬁning a de facto parent 
as a parent who lived with the child and regularly performed a majority or a share of the care-
taking functions “for reasons primarily other than ﬁnancial compensation”). A few states also 
have permitted children to have three legal parents in limited situations. See Susan Frelich 
Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 16-22 (2008). 
139. See, e.g., Doug NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260 (2017). Not all states 
have robustly recognized de facto parents, however. See Michelle E. Kelly, De Facto Parents in 
Maryland: When Will the Law Recognize Their Rights?, 46 U. BALT. L.F. 116 (2016); Emily R. 
Lipps, Janice M. v. Margaret K.: Eliminating Same-Sex Parents’ Rights To Raise Their Children 
by Eliminating the De Facto Parent Doctrine, 68 MD. L. REV. 691 (2009). For unmarried same-
sex couples as well as some unmarried different-sex couples using assisted reproductive tech-
nologies, only one individual will be genetically related to the child; an approach to 
parenthood that respects children’s interests in these families will treat both individuals as 
parents from the moment of birth. Our primary concern here is with the legal treatment of 
children’s relationships with adults who are not their intended parents. 
140. The authorities framework also limits recognition of a child’s parents to two persons. Our 
approach, which is focused on furthering children’s interests, supports broadening children’s 
legally recognized parental relationships beyond the traditional number of two. 
141. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (denying grandparents access to children beyond 
that allowed by custodial mother); id. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that parents have 
an interest in choosing their child’s social companions, and therefore have a right to be free of 
“judicially compelled visitation” of grandparents over their objections); Michael H. v. Gerald 
D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (denying a biological father rights to a relationship with a child born 
to a mother married to another man); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (denying a 
biological father the right to veto an adoption when he lacked a developed relationship with 
the child); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (denying 
foster parents an adversarial hearing before children could be removed to another foster fam-
ily); Hafen, supra note 96, at 617 (noting that, legally, parental power “prevail[s] over the 
claims of the state, other outsiders, and the children themselves unless there is some compel-
ling justiﬁcation for interference”). 
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The new law of the child, in contrast, recognizes that relationships with other 
adults are central to children’s lives and provide the opportunity for children to 
experience more egalitarian, non-instrumental interactions. Parental relation-
ships, while crucial to a child’s well-being and development, are in large part 
deﬁned by children’s needs and incapacities. Children’s relationships with non-
parental adults, in contrast, may instead center around play, activities, friend-
ship, and other present-oriented aims. For example, children’s lives may be 
greatly enriched by relationships with former foster parents and, for adopted 
children, by relationships with their biological parents. Children may also ben-
eﬁt from relationships with adults in mentoring roles such as teachers, counse-
lors, and coaches; from relationships with professionals such as social workers, 
therapists, and doctors; and from relationships with noncustodial kin such as 
grandparents, aunts, and uncles. While many of these adults, such as grandpar-
ents, teachers, and therapists, d0 engage in caregiving activities, caregiving is not 
always the primary aim of these relationships. Instead these relationships often 
center around more egalitarian, noninstrumental interactions and shared activi-
ties like play. 
Children’s interests in forming and maintaining nonparental relationships 
may sometimes conﬂict with parents’ interests in controlling the upbringing of 
their children. The authorities framework largely resolves this conﬂict by pro-
tecting parental rights to the exclusion of children’s divergent interests. Concern 
for children’s well-being underlies this robust protection of parental rights, as 
the state traditionally assumes children’s interests coincide with those of their 
parents.
142
 This may often be the case, but children may also have interests out-
side that zone of alignment. By taking children’s broader interests seriously, the 
new law of the child supports giving children greater access to important adults 
in their lives, as set forth in more detail in Part III. 
b. Relationships with Other Children 
Children’s relationships with other children also serve multiple purposes be-
yond developmental needs. From a very early age, children possess capacities 
that help them build relationships with siblings and peers. Children may create 
 
142. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67 (plurality opinion) 
(assuming that the children’s interests coincided with the mother’s interests in limiting pater-
nal grandparent visitation); Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 (assuming that the daughter’s interests 
coincided with the interests of the legally presumed father to the exclusion of the biological 
father); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-32 (1972) (assuming that children agreed with 
their parents’ opposition to mandatory secondary education). 
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rich social worlds with other children both inside and outside the home and 
other parent-created spaces.
143
 
Sibling relationships in particular are among children’s most emotionally 
powerful and intimate relationships.
144
 Siblings are a “ﬁxture” in the family lives 
of children, and research demonstrates the important role that siblings play “as 
companions, conﬁdantes, combatants, and as the focus of social compari-
sons.”
145
 Although sibling relationships are multifaceted and vary across cul-
tures, “[t]hese relationships offer their own psychological beneﬁts, including the 
potential for ameliorating the deﬁciencies and disturbances in the child-parent 
relationship.”
146
  Siblings engage in “pretend play,” “shar[e] an imaginative 
world,” and conjecture about the motivations of others, all of which are both 
developmentally laden and pleasure-seeking activities.
147
 
Like sibling relationships, children’s peer relationships can play a vital, posi-
tive role in their lives, fostering creative play, emotional attachment, and per-
sonal experimentation.
148
  Peer relationships often expand and enhance chil-
dren’s present experiences while simultaneously stimulating their intellectual 
and emotional growth.
149
 Over time, peer relationships also provide positive op-
portunities for group projects, sexual exploration, and other identity-forming 
activities. 
 
143. See THORNE, supra note 102, at 20. 
144. See STEPHEN P. BANK & MICHAEL D. KAHN, THE SIBLING BOND, at xvii (2d ed. 1997); JUDY 
DUNN, SISTERS AND BROTHERS (1985); SIBLING RELATIONSHIPS: THEIR NATURE AND SIGNIFI-
CANCE ACROSS THE LIFESPAN (Michael E. Lamb & Brian Sutton-Smith eds., 1982); Jill Elaine 
Hasday, Siblings in Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897, 903-05 (2012) (discussing cases of siblings 
separated by adoption). 
145. See Susan M. McHale et al., Sibling Relationships and Inﬂuences in Childhood and Adolescence, 74 
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 913, 913 (2012). 
146. SALMAN AKHTAR, THE DAMAGED CORE: ORIGINS, DYNAMICS, MANIFESTATIONS, AND TREAT-
MENT 28 (2009); see also Salman Akhtar, Early Relationships and Their Internalization, in THE 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 39, 46 (Ethel S. Person et 
al. eds., 2005) (arguing that sibling bonds can inﬂuence “evolving character traits” and exert 
lifelong impact on the choice of relationships). 
147. See Judy Dunn, Siblings, in THE CHILD: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC COMPANION 902, 905 (Richard A. 
Shweder et al. eds., 2009). 
148. Some researchers suggest that children’s environments, including their peer relationships, 
play a much larger role in their personality development than does parental inﬂuence. See 
JUDITH RICH HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTION: WHY CHILDREN TURN OUT THE WAY 
THEY DO 147-71 (1998); Judith Rich Harris, Where Is the Child’s Environment? A Group Social-
ization Theory of Development, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 458, 483 (1995). 
149. See MARY GAUVAIN, THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 59-61 (2001). Re-
search about children’s learning styles increasingly emphasizes the ways that children may 
learn more from their classmates than from their teachers. See, e.g., HOW PEOPLE LEARN: 
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These relationships remind us that “adults are not the sole or even the pri-
mary inﬂuence on the lives of most children.”
150
 Children’s sibling and peer re-
lationships often enable them to experience unique pleasures and purposes out-
side of hierarchical relationships, even while they are simultaneously subject to 
parental or other adult control.
151
 Children may play a role in the lives of other 
children in a way that does not depend on adult or state power, yet which is also 
made possible—or impossible—by that power.
152
 For example, children are de-
pendent on the state or private adults for structuring the social contexts of 
schools and other youth organizations and for providing the material conditions 
(such as transportation, clothing, and food) that enable them to take advantage 
of those relationship-forming opportunities. Furthermore, children’s peer rela-
tionships are often segregated along class, gender, racial, and other identity lines, 
and parents, teachers, and other adults are in a position to encourage acceptance 
and integration.
153
 
The authorities framework generally overlooks children’s interests in rela-
tionships with other children, even sibling relationships,
154
 instead focusing on 
them only when they are derivative of the parent-child relationship. For exam-
ple, if the parent-child relationship falls apart due to abuse or neglect, existing 
law focuses on repairing that relationship or ﬁnding a new parental relationship 
for the child.
155
 Children’s interests in their sibling relationships are often sec-
ondary, valued only to the extent that they do not interfere with reuniﬁcation or 
termination and adoption. Many states do not guarantee that siblings will live 
 
BRAIN, MIND, EXPERIENCE, AND SCHOOL (John D. Bransford et al. eds., 1999); Roger Pass-
man, Experiences with Student-Centered Teaching and Learning in High-Stakes Assessment Envi-
ronments, 122 EDUC. 189, 196 (2001). 
150. Donna Elder, Peers, in THE CHILD: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC COMPANION, supra note 147, at 716. 
151. Cf. Minow, supra note 13, at 297 (noting that the law could easily acknowledge that children 
need some forms of freedom but also need “guidance, involvement, support, and even control 
to protect them from harms against which they cannot protect themselves”). 
152. Cf. Leena Alanen, Rethinking Childhood, 31 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 53, 58 (1988) (criticizing how 
the “intentions and interests of children as participants in their own socialization are effec-
tively excluded” in much sociological discourse about children). 
153. See BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, “WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER IN THE CAF-
ETERIA?”: AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE 52-74 (1997); DANIEL YON, ELUSIVE CUL-
TURE: SCHOOLING, RACE, AND IDENTITY IN GLOBAL TIMES 29-31 (2000). 
154. See Hasday, supra note 144, at 902 (noting that “legal interest in sibling relationships is radi-
cally underdeveloped”). Inheritance law is an exception, although it tends to focus on adult 
siblings. See Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 369 (2012) (advocating for a 
legal regime that allows the children of donor parents to connect with one another); Frances 
H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 241-42 (2001). 
155. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2012). 
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with one another once removed from the home, or that they will even be able to 
visit one another if they are adopted into different homes.
156
 Rather than recog-
nizing the intrinsic importance of sibling relationships, the law largely views 
them as a collateral consequence of the parent-child relationship.
157
 
The authorities framework also largely renders invisible children’s positive 
relationships with non-sibling peers, tending to treat peer relationships as 
sources of dangerous inﬂuence and pressure.
158
 Of course, the law rightly au-
thorizes state intervention designed to end harmful peer relationships. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title IX to impose tort liability on 
schools that fail to protect students from harassment by other students on school 
grounds.
159
 Many states and school districts also have adopted anti-bullying 
 
156. See DWYER, supra note 114, at 903, 983 (emphasizing that most states give “children no right 
to maintain a relationship with siblings who live in a different household”); Mary Anne Her-
rick & Wendy Piccus, Sibling Connections: The Importance of Nurturing Sibling Bonds in the Fos-
ter Care System, 27 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 845, 856 (2005). This contrasts with children’s 
(albeit limited) rights to maintain relationships with parents. David D. Meyer, The Modest 
Promise of Children’s Relationship Rights, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1117, 1119 & n.10 (2003). 
157. A few state legislatures have given more attention to prioritizing the preservation of sibling 
relationships when the state assumes physical custody over children upon a ﬁnding of abuse 
or neglect. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501.1(g) (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46b-129(j) (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-13(8)(h) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 169-C:19-d (LexisNexis 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(f) (West 2013). And the federal 
government has attempted to promote sibling visitation during and after foster care. Foster-
ing Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of October 2008, § 206, Pub. L. No. 
110-351, 122 Stat. 3949, 3962 (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2012)). But these efforts are limited. 
See Randi Mandelbaum, Delicate Balances: Assessing the Needs and Rights of Siblings in Foster 
Care To Maintain Their Relationships Post-Adoption, 41 N.M. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (2011); Ellen Mar-
rus, Fostering Family Ties: The State as Maker and Breaker of Kinship Relationships, 2004 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 319, 324, 333; Ellen Marrus, “Where Have You Been, Fran?”: The Right of Siblings to 
Seek Court Access To Override Parental Denial of Visitation, 66 TENN. L. REV. 977, 995 (1999). 
158. For example, this characterization is emphasized in juvenile sentencing decisions like Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (stating that “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible 
to negative inﬂuences and outside pressures, including peer pressures” in part because they 
“have less control, or less experience with control, over their own environment”), and in the 
First Amendment case, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992) (“The undeniable fact is 
that the school district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places 
public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, 
maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction.”). 
159. See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
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statutes or policies
160
 and have passed various forms of anti-gang legislation.
161
 
These laws are vitally important for children’s safety and overall well-being. But 
they should not eclipse the ways in which children’s positive peer relationships 
enrich their lives. 
Other forms of state intervention target less obvious harms presumed to ﬂow 
from children’s interactions with other children outside of adult supervision. By 
passing curfew ordinances that limit the hours in which minors may congregate 
outside the home, states aim to prevent potential harm by controlling children’s 
interactions with each other.
162
 These regulations reinforce the primacy of the 
parent-child relationship while simultaneously positing children’s relationships 
with other children as threatening and unsafe. Similar concerns may be found in 
generalized fears about peer pressure.
163
 
Sexual relationships between children are often viewed as particularly threat-
ening. Some states criminalize teen sexual behavior in the hope that potential 
sanctions will deter some children (generally boys) from pursuing sex, and will 
 
160. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West 2012). For an overview of state approaches, 
see DENA T. SACCO, AN OVERVIEW OF STATE ANTI-BULLYING LEGISLATION AND OTHER  
RELATED LAWS 11 (2012), http://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/ﬁles/State
_Anti_bullying_Legislation_Overview.pdf [http://perma.cc/B9YE-X6VE]. Such legislation 
generally responds to the ways bullying may threaten the state’s ability to control children’s 
learning environments, thus reinforcing the authorities framework. See, e.g., Kowalski v. 
Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
161. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West 2018); see also Beth Bjerregaard, The Constitutional-
ity of Anti-Gang Legislation, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 31, 32-33 (1998) (identifying other state anti-
gang statutes). Such legislation is often motivated by fears that gangs will displace parental 
or state control over children. In Oklahoma, for instance, it is a misdemeanor to cause, aid, 
abet, or encourage a child to become a “runaway child,” deﬁned in reference to a parent or 
custodian’s consent and knowledge. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 856 (West 2015). 
162. See Gregory Z. Chen, Youth Curfews and the Trilogy of Parent, Child, and State Relations, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 132 (1997). Children are generally permitted in public after curfew hours 
only when accompanied by a parent, when engaging in an organized activity approved of by 
a parent, or when running an errand for a parent. See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 
188 F.3d 531, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (plurality); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 493-
95 (5th Cir. 1993); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 370 (Iowa 1989). 
163. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 148, at 147-71. Many legal commentators are concerned with the 
dynamics of peer pressure. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 78, at 1002-11. But other commentators 
overlook it given their focus on parents and the state. See, e.g., Holning Lau, Pluralism: A 
Principle for Children’s Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 317, 327 (2007) (emphasizing that 
“[t]wo major sources of assimilation demands on children are their parents and the state” 
without acknowledging that children can also assert assimilation demands on one another). 
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encourage other children (generally girls) to resist.
164
 State laws also often stig-
matize teenage reproduction while simultaneously denying adolescents the 
means to manage the reproductive and health consequences of sexual relation-
ships. Some states, for example, pursue policies designed to isolate teenage 
mothers from other children by encouraging them to attend alternative educa-
tional programs,
165
 or by segregating them from other children when they are in 
state custody.
166
  Yet many states offer only limited sex education in public 
schools, and no state mandates that schools provide children with condoms or 
other forms of contraception.
167
 Even when states acknowledge that adolescents 
are unlikely to defer sex, they focus on preventing this perceived harm rather 
than acknowledging the present positive experiences of sex for most adolescents. 
In contrast, the new law of the child takes account of children’s broader interests 
in maintaining positive relationships with other children throughout childhood. 
 
164. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 
142-46 (2d ed. 2004) (detailing state “age of consent” laws); see also Michelle Fine, Sexuality, 
Schooling, and Adolescent Females: The Missing Discourse of Desire, 58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 29 
(1988) (arguing that the anti-sex rhetoric surrounding sex education does little to enhance 
the development of sexual responsibility and subjectivity in adolescents). The Bush Admin-
istration made the gendered assumptions beyond these laws explicit in both its marriage-
promotion policies and its restrictions on federal sex education funding. See LINDA C. 
MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 135-
38, 256-89 (2006). But children are often not prosecuted under such statutes. The few pros-
ecutions that occur may be motivated by concerns about particular sexual practices, including 
those between same-sex partners and partners of different races and those that result in preg-
nancy. See, e.g., Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 978 F. 
Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff ’d, 148 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 1998). 
165. See Amber Hausenﬂuck, A Pregnant Teenager’s Right to Education in Texas, 9 SCHOLAR 151, 169-
83 (2006); Kate Giammarise, Alternative-School Leader Helps Girls To Develop Life Skills, BLADE 
(Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.toledoblade.com/Education/2008/09/18/Alternative-school 
-leader-helps-girls-to-develop-life-skills.html [http://perma.cc/4HMC-LCYB]. Some pub-
lic school districts even operated separate schools for pregnant girls until relatively recently. 
See, e.g., Julie Bosman, Schools for Pregnant Girls, Relic of 1960s New York, Will Close,  
N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/24/education/24educ.html 
[http://perma.cc/9ZWB-GJWS]. 
166. See Lauren Silver, Minding the Gap: Adolescent Mothers Navigate Child Welfare, 82 SOC. SERV. 
REV. 615 (2008). 
167. Some states have also charged children with violations of child pornography laws when they 
send sexually explicit texts to one another, even when they are sending their own images to 
their peers. See Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor 
Leary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505 (2008). 
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2. Exposure to New Ideas 
Children also ﬂourish emotionally and intellectually when they are exposed 
to new ideas. Of course, all ideas are new to an infant; we are focused primarily 
on children’s access to ideas as they age. By “new ideas,” we mean ideas different 
from those that a child encounters in the home; depending on the family, new 
ideas might, in fact, be socially traditional ideas. At times, these new ideas ﬂow 
from the relationships described above, for it is through individuals outside the 
home that children discover new ideas. At other times, children are exposed to 
new ideas through group activities and other social settings beyond the family. 
For many children, teachers, mentors, peers, and extra-curricular activities may 
be the primary source of exposure to new ideas. 
Exposure to new ideas furthers a range of children’s interests, including in-
tellectual learning, creative explorations, social pleasures, and new ways of view-
ing the world. The authorities framework recognizes some of these interests but 
generally values children’s exposure to new ideas only to the extent it helps pre-
pare children for future lives as autonomous adult citizens. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Board of Education v. Pico, “access [to ideas] prepares students for 
active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in 
which they will soon be adult members.”
168
 As such, school officials may not im-
pede children’s access to library books simply because those officials believe such 
exposure would be harmful or foster discord.
169
 In a similar vein, the Third Cir-
cuit has held that schools may not limit student speech on social networking sites 
if students did not intend for the speech to reach the school and there is no rea-
sonable forecast that the speech would cause substantial disruption at school.
170
 
The authorities framework thus protects children’s exposure to new ideas if 
that exposure prepares children to become autonomous, mature, economically 
self-reliant members of a liberal democratic society. Children’s interest in educa-
tion therefore has been a bedrock of the ﬁeld of children and law for close to a 
 
168. 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982). 
169. See id.; see also Case v. Uniﬁed Sch. Dist. No. 233, 908 F. Supp. 864 (D. Kans. 1995); Counts 
v. Cedarville Sch. Dist., 295 F. Supp. 2d 996 (W.D. Ark. 2003). 
170. See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); Layshock v. Her-
mitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); see also Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 
No. 728, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842 (D. Minn. 2015) (holding that the school district could not expel 
a student for an online post about a teacher); T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Community 
Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (holding that the defendant could not sus-
pend students from extracurricular activities for posting provocative photographs on the in-
ternet). 
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century. Although the Supreme Court has held that education is not a funda-
mental interest protected by the U.S. Constitution,
171
 every state guarantees a 
free public education,
172
 and the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe held that this 
right must extend to undocumented immigrant children on the same terms as 
other children.
173
 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on past decisions 
recognizing “public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation 
of a democratic system of government,”
174
 and “as the primary vehicle for trans-
mitting ‘the values on which our society rests.’”
175
 The Court also relied on Wis-
consin v. Yoder to emphasize that “education prepares individuals to be self-reliant 
and self-sufficient participants in society.”
176
 Lower courts have addressed the 
states’ interest in exposing children to new ideas as conducive to “teaching fun-
damental values ‘essential to a democratic society,’” including tolerance.
177
 
These developmental concerns are vitally important to children and their 
well-being, but they reﬂect only one dimension of the value of exposure to new 
ideas for children. The new law of the child emphasizes that exposure also 
broadens and enriches children’s experiences in the here and now. Children are 
stimulated by new ideas: they enjoy humor, learning, experimenting, and ex-
ploring. Even at very young ages, children possess a capacity for initiating rela-
 
171. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
172. See, e.g., CONN. CONST., art. VIII, § 1. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does 
not impose obligations on states to fund public schools equally, see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, but 
state constitutions often require more in the way of funding than the federal Constitution, see, 
e.g., CONN. CONST., art VIII, § 4. Many state legislatures also have adopted public school 
funding formulas that require some degree of wealth-equalization across school districts. See 
Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1963, 1971-72 (2008). 
173. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see also Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National 
Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330 (2006) (offering a constitutional theory for educational ade-
quacy). 
174. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring)). 
175. Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979)); see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37 
(emphasizing that public schools “provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic 
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in 
the political process” once they become adults). 
176. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)). 
177. Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1068 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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tionships and activities and for choosing how to live their lives within the pa-
rameters given to them. They are young scientists as well as philosophers, inves-
tigating the world around them.
178
 
Children’s abilities to respond to new ideas may be different from those of 
adults, but they are no less important. Children’s abilities are perhaps most 
clearly illustrated in the context of their pretend play, where children deploy 
heightened powers of imagination to create new worlds, to connect with and 
control other people, to learn that other people have minds, and to consider 
choices among varying alternatives.
179
 Exposure to new ideas enriches this play, 
as children are given the tools to imagine new possibilities for their lives both in 
the present and for the future. 
Of course, children’s present interests in exposure to new ideas do not eclipse 
their developmental interests as future citizens. To the contrary, the two are in-
timately connected. Children’s exposure to new ideas enriches the present in part 
because of its developmental thrust. Children’s exploration of the world of ideas 
both nurtures their present needs and desires as children and helps prepare them 
to become adult members of a liberal polity that values individual autonomy, 
tolerance, and pluralism.
180
 Acknowledging this interplay and ﬂuidity between 
children’s present and developmental interests strengthens the importance of 
children’s exposure to new ideas. 
Schools are crucial to the task of exposing children to new ideas, for as the 
Supreme Court has stated, the classroom is “peculiarly the ‘marketplace of 
ideas.’”
181
 Although public school children cannot be forced to recite the Pledge 
of Allegiance, or actively affirm any allegiance at all,
182
 children may be required 
 
178. See ALLISON GOPNIK, THE SCIENTIST IN THE CRIB: WHAT EARLY LEARNING TELLS US ABOUT 
THE MIND (2000); Allison James, Andrew N. Meltzoff & Patricia K. Kuhl, Children as Philos-
ophers, in RETHINKING CHILDHOOD, supra note 76. 
179. See JANET W. ASTINGTON, PAUL L. HARRIS & DAVID R. OLSON, DEVELOPING THEORIES OF 
MIND (1988); PETER FONAGY ET AL., AFFECT REGULATION, MENTALIZATION, AND THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE SELF (2002). Play is not merely developmental but is also a part of children’s 
current well-being and can help them process past experiences and traumas: “In metaphori-
cally representing events that were originally threatening, children are able to take an active 
stance to control events in the reenactment, contributing a sense of empowerment or mastery 
over what was once unresolved and unsettling.” Cindy Dell Clark, Play Therapy, ENCYCLOPE-
DIA ON EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT (2013), http://www.child-encyclopedia.com/play
/according-experts/play-therapy [http://perma.cc/VGZ6-JVB8]. 
180. See Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1069 (6th Cir. 1987). 
181. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969). 
182. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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to listen to or read material at odds with their (or their parents’) beliefs.
183
 Yet 
under the authorities framework, parents generally control the extent of chil-
dren’s access to ideas outside the home. For example, thirty-ﬁve states allow par-
ents to withdraw their children from sex education classes.
184
 Children are not 
even required to attend school: homeschooling is allowed in every state, and reg-
ulations are relatively minimal.
185
 
How to strike the appropriate balance between fostering children’s interests 
in the parent-child relationship and their interests in exposure to new ideas is 
not clear-cut, but such balance will never be achieved if children’s broader inter-
ests are ignored. Children have developmental interests in becoming adult mem-
bers of society while also having present interests in exposure to new ideas that 
foster their engagement in the world around them. Once these multiple interests 
are acknowledged, we then have the opportunity to better promote them, as set 
forth in more detail in Part III. 
3. Expressions of Identity 
A child’s sense of self and belonging emerges early on and both strengthens 
and changes with age.
186
 This evolving sense of identity is ﬁrst and continuously 
forged through children’s relationships with their parents, but children’s identi-
ties are also always to some degree independent of parental inﬂuence.
187
 Chil-
dren, like adults, learn about themselves and others as they discover that people 
 
183. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, 
and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1993). 
184. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.03.016 (2016). 
185. See Homeschooling Regulations by State, PROPUBLICA (2015), http://projects.propublica.org
/graphics/homeschool [http://perma.cc/N8JV-SAJV]; see also Timothy Brandon Waddell, 
Note, Bringing It All Back Home: Establishing a Coherent Constitutional Framework for the Re-
regulation of Homeschooling, 63 VAND. L. REV. 541, 596-97 (2010) (discussing the relaxed reg-
ulation of homeschooling in many states). 
186. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968). See generally Catherine R. Cooper, 
Rachel Behrens & Nancy M. Trinh, Identity, in THE CHILD: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC COMPANION, 
supra note 147, at 474-77; Elaine Reese et al., Emerging Identities: Narrative and Self from Early 
Childhood to Early Adolescence, in NARRATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN ADOLESCENCE: CREATING THE 
STORIED SELF 23 (Kate C. McLean & Monisha Pasupathi eds., 2009). 
187. Psychoanalysts traditionally describe this process of identity formation in Oedipal terms. See, 
e.g., ANNE C. DAILEY, LAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE 212-15 
(2017); Hans W. Loewald, The Waning of the Oedipus Complex, 27 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC 
ASS’N 751, 757 (1979) (“[I]t is no exaggeration to say that the assumption of responsibility for 
one’s own life and its conduct is in psychic reality tantamount to the murder of the parents, 
to the crime of parricide.”). 
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in their lives possess diverse beliefs, affiliations, and lifestyles. Children also ex-
perience a range of emotions as they explore how they belong, or might belong, 
to various groups around them.
188
 This exploration affects children’s daily lives 
as much as it affects their futures, if not more.
189
 
The authorities framework does not acknowledge that children have present 
interests in developing and expressing identities, commitments, and values. In-
stead, the authorities framework focuses on children’s future identities as adults, 
suggesting that children’s identities are on hold until they reach the age of ma-
jority,
190
 and emphasizing concerns about parental indoctrination. In this view, 
parental indoctrination works because children lack the capacity to develop their 
own values and commitments.
191
 To set limits on parental indoctrination, the 
authorities framework aims to keep aspects of children’s character unformed un-
til the age of majority, when young adults are able to choose who they are for 
themselves. Under the prevailing view, then, law often affirmatively denies chil-
dren’s interests in expressing their identities in favor of children’s ultimate inter-
ests in becoming autonomous adult citizens. 
Yet the idea that children’s identity formation is on hold is obviously a ﬁction. 
Children from the earliest age have an evolving sense of identity that they ex-
press across multiple forums, including home, school, and the many spaces in 
between.
192
 These expressions of identity implicate multiple intersecting traits, 
 
188. Catherine R. Cooper et al., Beyond Demographic Categories: How Immigration, Ethnicity, and 
“Race” Matter for Children’s Identities and Pathways Through School, in DEVELOPMENTAL PATH-
WAYS THROUGH MIDDLE CHILDHOOD: RETHINKING CONTEXTS AND DIVERSITY AS RESOURCES 
181, 200 (Catherine R. Cooper et al. eds., 2005). 
189. See, e.g., THORNE, supra note 102, at 11-28; Anca Gheaus, Unﬁnished Adults and Defective Chil-
dren: On the Nature and Value of Childhood, 9 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 5-6, 8-14 (2015). 
190. See, e.g., Sonja Shield, The Doctor Won’t See You Now: Rights of Transgender Adolescents to Sex 
Reassignment Treatment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 361, 363 (2007) (“The law presumes 
that parents will act in the best interest of their minor children, so that parents’ decisions 
about whether a transgender adolescent will receive sex reassignment treatment can effectively 
act as ‘an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto’ over the adolescent’s identity and physical self-
determination until the adolescent turns eighteen.”). The Supreme Court embraced this view 
in Prince v. Massachusetts, when it declared: “Parents may be free to become martyrs them-
selves. But they are not free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children be-
fore they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for 
themselves.” 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). 
191. Relatedly, philosopher Tamar Schapiro argues that children lack the capacity for moral agency, 
which justiﬁes paternalistic behavior toward them. Tamar Schapiro, What Is a Child?, 
109 ETHICS 715, 729-37 (1999). 
192. See Rosenbury, supra note 10, at 841-46. 
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such as race, gender, class, religion, ethics, cultural affiliations, and sexual orien-
tation, as well as political and social beliefs.
193
 They also pervade children’s daily 
lives, as debates about the right of transgender children to use the bathroom of 
their chosen gender at school reveal.
194
 
The Supreme Court and social scientists have recognized that children’s 
identities are more ﬂuid than adults’ identities, changing rapidly over time.
195
 
The Court’s recent decisions on juvenile sentencing rely in part on developmen-
tal literature showing that “[t]he personality traits of juveniles are more transi-
tory, less ﬁxed.”
196
 As the Court stated in Roper v. Simmons, “[t]he reality that 
juveniles still struggle to deﬁne their identity means it is less supportable to con-
clude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretriev-
ably depraved character.”
197
 But this ﬂuidity need not diminish children’s present 
interests. Although children’s characters undoubtedly evolve, the fact that they 
are transitory need not imply that they are not deserving of recognition or re-
spect. Instead, space exists between formed and unformed characters, and chil-
dren possess strong values and commitments in this liminal space. 
Children have often asked courts to respect these present values and com-
mitments, only to be rebuffed. For example, in Prince, nine-year old Betty Sim-
mons sought to defend her right to distribute religious materials on the streets 
of Brockton, Massachusetts as an ordained minister of the Jehovah’s Witness 
faith. The Supreme Court recognized “[t]he rights of children to exercise their 
religion.”
198
 Nevertheless, it held that Simmons had no right to express her reli-
gious identity in this manner because she had not “reached the age of full and 
legal discretion.”
199
 The Court at no point considered whether Simmons’ reli-
gious beliefs were sincere or genuine despite her age. Although Prince is a rela-
tively old case, courts continue to follow its lead. In 1972, the Court of Appeals 
of New York affirmed a ﬁnding of neglect where a Jehovah’s Witness refused to 
 
193. See, e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 188; Diane N. Ruble et al., The Development of a Sense of 
“We”: The Emergence and Implications of Children’s Collective Identity, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE SOCIAL SELF (M. Bennet & F. Sani eds., 2004). 
194. See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated, 
137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). Controversies over medical treatment for transgender children also 
implicate debates over gender identity in young children. See supra note 190. 
195. See Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children’s Rights, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 361-
62. 
196. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND 
CRISIS (1968)). 
197. Id. 
198. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944). 
199. Id. at 170. 
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consent to a blood transfusion for her 15-year-old son.
200
 The trial court did not 
consider the child’s wishes in its opinion and explicitly declined to wait until the 
child could legally decide for himself.
201
 In 2012, the Eastern District of Califor-
nia cited Prince when it dismissed children’s claims that a statute barring conver-
sion therapy (or “sexual orientation change efforts”) violated their constitutional 
rights.
202
 
At other times, courts have respected children’s interests in expressing their 
identities and political views, but only to the extent those interests supported 
children’s future development. In Tinker, for example, the Supreme Court up-
held children’s right to wear black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam 
War.
203
 A plurality of the Court justiﬁed its holding in part on the ground that 
recognizing children’s free speech rights in school would help prepare them for 
adult citizenship: “The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through 
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas . . . .”
204
 The Court thus recog-
nized children’s interests, but as citizens-in-waiting as opposed to full citizens in 
the present. 
Some courts, however, have questioned the value of self-expression even in 
relation to children’s development. For example, courts have permitted censor-
ship in schools even when children are expressing political views, such as when 
Hispanic students in Texas were suspended for wearing “We Are Not Criminals” 
t-shirts and walking out of class in protest.
205
 Courts are even more likely to per-
mit censorship in schools when children are expressing identities that are not 
overtly political in nature. The Ninth Circuit held that a school could prohibit a 
student from wearing Marilyn Manson t-shirts,
206
 for example, and some courts 
have upheld prohibitions on long
207
 or braided
208
 hair. Courts have generally 
dismissed children’s interests in such expressions as frivolous or otherwise un-
important. Many children, however, are most concerned about visible aspects of 
 
200. In re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972). 
201. In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 655-57 (Fam. Ct. 1970) (ﬁnding that the court cannot “shift 
the responsibility for the ultimate decision onto [the child’s] shoulders”). 
202. Pickup v. Brown, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1371-73 (E.D. Cal. 2012). 
203. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
204. Id. at 512. 
205. Madrid v. Anthony, 510 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D. Tex. 2007). 
206. Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000). 
207. See, e.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972). But see, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 
F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970). 
208. See, e.g., Fenceroy v. Morehouse Par. Sch. Bd., No. Civ. A. 05-0480, 2006 WL 39255 (W.D. 
La. Jan. 6, 2006). 
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their identities, such as race, gender, and their emerging sexual identities, and 
they use hair styles, clothing, and choice of music to explore and express those 
aspects.
209
 Law should better recognize and support children’s expressions of all 
aspects of their identities. These expressions give voice to who children are as 
individuals at a particular time, enriching both their self-awareness and their ac-
ceptance of others who may differ. 
4. Personal Integrity and Privacy 
Children also have interests in maintaining their bodily and emotional in-
tegrity and in shielding certain aspects of their bodies and lives from others.
210
 
These interests include safety from harm and freedom from unwanted intru-
sions. The authorities framework, through the current child welfare system, 
strives to protect some of these interests, speciﬁcally children’s interests in being 
protected from unreasonable abuse and neglect and other acts of family vio-
lence.
211
 The new law of the child supports those efforts but seeks both to focus 
them and move beyond them in order to promote children’s broader interests in 
exercising control over their bodies and minds more generally. 
From very early ages, children’s evolving understandings of themselves are 
informed by changing bodily traits and capacities, such as height, weight, race, 
sex, disability, and physical prowess. As they undergo rapid physical changes, 
children’s bodies play an important role in children’s evolving identities and ex-
perience of the world. Children’s bodies often represent milestones and other-
wise mark time and development in ways that adult bodies do not.
212
 Because of 
such differences, the new law of the child posits that children’s bodies are worthy 
of protection above and beyond that provided to adult bodies. 
The authorities framework often views children’s bodily differences through 
the lens of disability, in keeping with its general view of children as lesser 
adults.
213
 This view is grounded in physical reality to some extent, as most pre-
adolescent children are physically smaller and weaker than most adults and their 
 
209. See, e.g., Clifford J. Rosky, No Promo Hetero: Children’s Right To Be Queer, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 
425, 502, 510 (2013) (concluding that “[t]he Constitution protects every child’s right to an 
open future in sexual and gender development—an equal liberty to be straight or queer”). 
210. See B. Jessie Hill, Constituting Children’s Bodily Integrity, 64 DUKE L.J. 1295 (2015). 
211. See, e.g., JOHN E.B. MYERS, A HISTORY OF CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA (2004). 
212. Adult bodies also change over time, albeit—with the exception of pregnancy—at a slower rate. 
213. The invocation of disability—in contrast to a mythical concept of “normality”—has also been 
used to justify racial and gender inequality, as well as the systemic marginalization of children 
and adults with disabilities. Douglas C. Baynton, Disability and the Justiﬁcation of Inequality in 
American History, in THE NEW DISABILITY HISTORY: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 36 (Paul K. 
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brains do not fully mature until around the age of twenty-ﬁve.
214
 Yet children’s 
bodies are not necessarily less capable than the bodies of adults. Children heal 
more quickly; they outperform adults in many athletic activities; their capacity 
for physical play is almost unmatched in adult life; and their bodies have the 
capacity to change dramatically through growth spurts, neuroplasticity, and hor-
monal surges.
215
  Children’s vulnerabilities therefore exist alongside unique 
physical and mental capacities. Viewing children as lesser adults narrowly con-
strues children’s interests in their bodies as largely limited to protection from 
harm. 
The focus on preventing child maltreatment overshadows the many ways 
children’s interests in personal integrity and privacy might be better promoted 
and protected. Indeed, by prioritizing parental rights and narrowly deﬁning 
maltreatment, the authorities framework permits parental behavior that would 
otherwise violate the bodily integrity of adults. Children come into the world 
completely dependent on their caregivers, meaning that caregivers must have full 
and unfettered access to and control over children’s bodies from birth. Some 
bodily “intrusions” are therefore initially acceptable and even necessary, such as 
holding, soothing, caressing, feeding, and bathing infants and young children. 
But the intrusiveness of bodily ministrations becomes more troublesome as a 
child grows older. Activities that are acceptable for an infant, such as bathings, 
feedings, or physical restraints, would raise serious concerns for a ten- or ﬁfteen-
year old. Although the authorities framework does take account of children’s 
changing interests in bodily integrity and privacy, its deference to parental rights 
may leave children unprotected against harmful parental intrusions. 
The new law of the child therefore recognizes a broader range of interests in 
personal integrity and privacy within the home. Aside from physical or sexual 
abuse, the authorities framework does not recognize such interests unless and 
until parental intrusions become a matter of public concern (for example, if par-
ents start posting nude photographs of children online). Parents may consent to 
 
Longmore & Lauri Umansky eds., 2001). Challenging and dismantling these constructions is 
a project that spans more than one ﬁeld of study. 
214. See State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 815-16 (Iowa 2016). 
215. See generally THE HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY (Richard M. Lerner ed., 6th ed. 2006) 
(detailing the various stages of children’s psychological development); PETER R. HUT-
TENLOCHER, NEURAL PLASTICITY: THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE CEREBRAL CORTEX (2002) (describing neural plasticity—the brain’s ability to change in 
response to normal developmental processes, experience, and injury—in children and adults); 
CYNTHIA LIGHTFOOT & SHEILA R. COLE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN (7th ed. 2012) (ex-
amining child development as a process involving the whole child within multiple, mutually 
inﬂuencing contexts); LAURENCE STEINBERG, ADOLESCENCE (9th ed. 2010) (discussing bio-
logical, cognitive, and relationship changes during adolescence). 
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governmental searches of their children’s bedrooms, and they may certainly 
search those bedrooms themselves.
216
 Parental dissemination of private infor-
mation about children’s bodies—or children’s lives more generally—also largely 
goes unchallenged.
217
 In fact, it has become common practice for parents to de-
tail children’s lives on social media and in the mainstream press, often to further 
parents’ own interests instead of those of their children.
218
 
The new law of the child seeks to provide a framework for better balancing 
children’s distinct interests in personal integrity and privacy against these paren-
tal interests. Potential conﬂicts are most likely to arise around issues relating to 
sexuality, reproductive healthcare, and abortion. For example, as discussed 
above, older children have interests in experimenting with sex, both to experi-
ence physical pleasure and to expand their understanding of connection and in-
timacy. Although statutory rape laws and sexting prohibitions make sense for 
young children, laws that prohibit teenagers from engaging in consensual sexual 
interactions with each other may interfere with their interests in learning about 
the sexual dimensions of their lives.
219
 
Children also have interests in controlling the ﬂow of information to their 
parents, especially when their actions and decisions may conﬂict with their par-
ents’ wishes. For example, children’s chosen gender identities or sexual orienta-
tions might be known at school but not at home, and children have an interest 
in keeping it this way. Children may also seek to access certain types of healthcare 
on their own. Most states allow children to access mental health or drug coun-
seling services without notifying their parents. In contrast, the state is free to 
 
216. See Kristin Henning, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Children at Home: When Parental Au-
thority Goes Too Far, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 55, 70 (2011) (“[A] child obviously has no pro-
tection against the intrusion of his parents into his bedroom because the provision is meant 
only to protect the privacy of the individual against state actors.”). 
217. See Stacey B. Steinberg, Sharenting: Children’s Privacy in the Age of Social Media, 66 EMORY L.J. 
839, 847-54 (2017). Some parents’ publicity has been extreme enough to attract widespread 
attention. Sally Mann, whose photography collection Immediate Family features portraits of 
her children nude and injured, is one example. Sally Mann, Sally Mann’s Exposure, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/magazine/the-cost-of-sally 
-manns-exposure.html [http://perma.cc/G7DK-WRYB]; Richard B. Woodward, The Dis-
turbing Photography of Sally Mann, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 27, 1992), http://www.nytimes
.com/1992/09/27/magazine/the-disturbing-photography-of-sally-mann.html [http://
perma.cc/DAN7-3U3X]. 
218. See Steinberg, supra note 217, at 847-54. 
219. See, e.g., JoAnne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate Teenagers’ Constitutional Rights?, 48 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 951 (2011); Lawrence G. Walters, How To Fix the Sexting Problem: An Anal-
ysis of the Legal and Policy Considerations for Sexting Legislation, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 98 
(2010). 
the new law of the child 
1503 
impose parental notiﬁcation or consent requirements on children seeking to ter-
minate a pregnancy, so long as it provides a process for judicial bypass.
220
 Thus, 
in states with notiﬁcation or consent statutes, a child will be forced to disclose 
her pregnancy to either her parents or a judge. 
Our approach questions how these practices affect children’s broader inter-
ests in personal integrity and privacy, thereby attempting to bring those interests 
to center stage. Children currently enjoy almost no privacy rights vis-à-vis their 
parents, and instead must rely on parental decisions to respect their privacy in-
terests.
221
 More fully recognizing children’s interests in personal integrity and 
privacy does not mean that all parental or state intrusions should be prohibited, 
but it will mandate different ways of balancing children’s present and future in-
terests against parental prerogatives, as set forth in Part III. 
5. Participation in Civic Life 
Finally, children have interests in interacting with society beyond the con-
ﬁnes of family or school. Children’s nonparental relationships further some of 
these interests, but children also have interests in participating in larger societal 
structures, including in the economy and in politics. The authorities framework 
almost entirely overlooks these interests when it assumes that children are 
largely conﬁned to home, school, or rehabilitative settings until they become 
adults.
222
 The traditional infancy defense is illustrative: pursuant to this defense, 
children are permitted to void contracts into which they otherwise validly en-
tered before reaching the age of majority,
223
 thus limiting a child’s engagement 
in the world of commerce. 
 
220. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
221. Emily Gold Waldman, Show and Tell?: Students’ Personal Lives, Schools, and Parents, 47 CONN. 
L. REV. 699, 728-30 (2015) (summarizing case law establishing that children do not have pri-
vacy rights in relation to their parents). 
222. See supra text accompanying note 97. 
223. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12(2)(b), 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). This doc-
trine has shifted to some extent as the authorities framework has come to recognize older 
children’s autonomy in certain contexts. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clar-
ifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1304 (2000) (“A clear, straightforward rule 
recognizing adolescent decisional ability to contract would be commensurate with the dili-
gence, efficiency, and economic hallmarks of contract law and, perhaps more potently, culti-
vate its mainstream moral component—that promises ought to be kept.”). For example, the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment recently adopted a minority rule that 
requires contracting children to make restitution “as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 16(1), 33(1) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011). This emerging view better recognizes and facilitates children’s participation in 
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Yet almost all children attending school are exposed to aspects of civil society 
and politics and may seek to participate in them. Children’s opportunities to en-
gage in civic life are of utmost importance and often differ vastly for children 
based on their race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and 
many other dimensions of children’s lives. At least one recent case successfully 
grappled with this reality. In Dancy v. McGinley, the Second Circuit affirmed an 
award of emotional damages to Elting, a seventeen-year-old African American 
boy who was beaten by a police officer in the course of an arrest for a crime he 
did not commit.
224
 Reﬂecting many of the concerns raised by the Black Lives 
Matter movement, the Second Circuit held that the award of $115,000 in emo-
tional damages was not excessive. The court noted that Elting’s age was “of par-
ticular signiﬁcance,” since the event would have “a deeper and [more] lasting 
impact on a seventeen-year old than an adult.”
225
 More speciﬁcally, the court em-
phasized that the event had led Elting to lose “trust in the police,” quoting Justice 
Sotomayor’s description of “the talk” that “black and brown parents” must give 
their children to keep them safe from police violence.
226
 
Children’s broader interests as political actors, workers, consumers, and, 
more generally, agents in the world are varied and diverse across multiple di-
mensions.
227
 For example, many children desire to engage in paid work, whether 
to enable consumption or to support their families. And almost all children seek 
to purchase goods or to inﬂuence the purchases of others. Nurturing and legiti-
mizing these interests can lead to radical policy shifts. 
Despite children’s interests in participating in civic life, existing law excludes 
children from the quintessential means of doing so: they are denied the right to 
vote before they reach the age of eighteen.
228
 Some believe that children’s politi-
cal interests are represented by their parents,
229
 but parents neither receive more 
 
the market. Such reform is not motivated by children’s present interests, however. Instead, it 
seeks to protect adult parties from the harsh consequences of the traditional infancy doctrine. 
224. Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2016). 
225. Id. at 115. 
226. Id. (quoting Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)). 
227. See, e.g., Aoife Daly, Demonstrating Positive Obligations: Children’s Rights and Peaceful Protest in 
International Law, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 763, 770 (2013) (“Children consistently ex-
press that they wish to have greater participation in political matters.”). 
228. See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, The Right To Vote Under Local Law, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1039, 
1062-63 (2017). For an argument that children’s criminal responsibility should be linked to 
their ability to vote, see GIDEON YAFFE, THE AGE OF CULPABILITY: CHILDREN AND THE NATURE 
OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (forthcoming 2018). 
229. See, e.g., Barnett v. Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Children cannot vote, but 
their parents can.”); Barnett v. Daley, 32 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Children are citi-
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votes than other adults, nor are they permitted to vote by proxy on behalf of their 
children.
230
 The conception of childhood citizenship is greatly constrained. To 
the extent that citizenship is intimately tied to the franchise, children may ap-
propriately be viewed as citizens in waiting—or minor citizens—until the age of 
eighteen. 
Recognizing children’s present interests does not mean that children must be 
given full voting rights. Indeed, many children have no conception of voting and 
some would become the puppets of their parents or other adults in their lives. 
But our approach does make some proposals to extend voting rights to children 
less unrealistic. Andrew Rehfeld argues in favor of “fractional votes” for children 
beginning at age twelve. Like learners’ permits for the franchise, such “[f]rac-
tional shares would allow adolescents to internalize civic engagement at a time 
that their habits are forming and developing.”
231
 More than a dozen nations have 
lowered the voting age to sixteen for purposes of at least some elections, alt-
hough no jurisdiction has permitted children under sixteen to vote.
232
 Because 
the new law of the child acknowledges children’s interests in civic participation, 
especially as they age, it opens the door to some, perhaps modiﬁed, voting rights 
for children. 
* * * 
The foregoing discussion of children’s ﬁve broader interests is meant to be 
neither deﬁnitive nor exhaustive. We invite further examination of children’s in-
terests in the here and now that more fully explicates children’s experiences at 
multiple stages in their lives. Our assessment indicates, however, that children’s 
broader interests will not be furthered by mere reﬁnements to the authorities 
framework. A total restructuring of the ﬁeld of children and law is required. In 
 
zens; their interests are entitled to be considered by politicians, and this is more likely to hap-
pen if total rather than voting-age population is used in determining compliance with the 
equal protection clause, as it is in taking the census. For then the voting power of parents of 
minor children is ampliﬁed, giving such children a modest measure of representation in the 
political process.” (citations omitted)); Robert W. Bennett, Should Parents Be Given Extra Votes 
on Account of Their Children? Toward a Conversational Understanding of American Democracy, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505 (2000) (“It is widely assumed that voters who are parents cast the 
single votes they now receive in part at least in pursuit of the interests of their children.”). 
230. For one proposal to institute such proxy voting, see Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote: 
Proxies for Parents, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1463 (1998). For what such proxy voting may mean for 
American democracy, see Bennett, supra note 229, at 536-40. 
231. Andrew Rehfeld, The Child as Democratic Citizen, 633 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 141, 
158-59 (2011); see also ARCHARD, supra note 114, at 70-74 (arguing that children should not be 
denied the right to vote); Paul E. Peterson, An Immodest Proposal, 121 DAEDALUS 151 (1992) 
(comparing the extent of social welfare programs and expenditures for children and the el-
derly, while noting that only the latter have the right to vote). 
232. See Vivian E. Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, Cognitive Development, and the Age of Electoral 
Majority, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1447, 1473-74 (2012). 
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the next Part, we elaborate a new tripartite framework that we believe offers the 
best opportunity for advancing children’s broader interests. 
i i i .  relationships, responsibilities, rights: a new tripartite 
framework 
The articulation of children’s broader interests enables us to reimagine the 
ﬁeld of children and law, recentering it around a tripartite framework of rela-
tionships, responsibilities, and rights. This restructuring rejects the authorities 
framework’s preoccupation with assigning control over children to parents or the 
state. We aim to free the ﬁeld from its current reliance on hierarchical relation-
ships of control and the developmental concerns that drive them. Instead, our 
more coherent, integrated, and conceptually grounded structure is informed by 
the relationships that support children’s broader interests, adult responsibilities 
to further those interests, and affirmative rights that best protect them. 
By shifting the focal point from adult authority to children’s interests, a more 
normatively compelling way to organize the ﬁeld emerges, one that brings con-
ceptual ordering to the legal rules that can and should further children’s inter-
ests. We open with children’s relationships because children’s custodial status is 
the ﬁrst and primary deﬁning feature of children’s relationship to the law. Yet we 
go beyond custodial relationships of authority to address the full range of chil-
dren’s relationships that should be recognized and protected by law. Next, we 
highlight the responsibilities that adults do and should have to children—not 
simply as a by-product of adult authority, but independent of and prior to claims 
of authority. And ﬁnally, we articulate the range of rights furthering children’s 
interests, that is, not just rights of authority (parental rights; children’s agency 
rights) but most importantly children’s affirmative rights to goods and services. 
This tripartite scheme, we believe, most clearly structures the law to advance 
the broader interests of children we identiﬁed in Part II. Our framework, how-
ever, is not the only way to organize the ﬁeld of children and the law. This initial 
elaboration will beneﬁt from debate and development by courts, legislators, 
agencies, and commentators moving forward.
233
 For now, we emphasize that the 
new framework liberates the ﬁeld from its traditional focus on allocating author-
ity by location: home, school, and the juvenile justice system. Location still mat-
ters in our framework, but only as it informs legal rules relating to relationships, 
responsibilities, and rights. This new approach therefore moves toward the in-
tegration and consistency of legal rules across both place and time. The three 
 
233. Further reﬁnement might especially address the differing stages of children’s lives. For exam-
ple, one might imagine sub-categories of doctrine based on infancy, early childhood, and ad-
olescence. 
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organizing categories of relationships, responsibilities, and rights are neither 
ﬁxed nor independent. Most legal issues affecting children implicate all three 
areas. 
A rereading of the iconic case of Parham v. J.R.
234
 highlights how our new 
framework differs from the authorities framework. In this case, children who 
had been committed to state-run psychiatric hospitals argued that the laws al-
lowing parents to consent to their commitment violated their procedural due 
process rights. In place of parental consent, the children sought formal, adver-
sarial hearings to determine whether they met the criteria for commitment. The 
Supreme Court assumed that the children had important interests at stake, in-
cluding freedom from bodily restraint and avoidance of the stigma that might 
follow from commitment. The Court ultimately concluded, however, that an in-
formal review by a “neutral factﬁnder” at the admitting institution was all that 
the Constitution required.
235
 In reaching this conclusion, the Court invoked 
“Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental author-
ity over minor children,”
236
 emphasizing that the law “historically . . . has recog-
nized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of 
their children.”
237
 The Court also noted that “[t]he statist notion that govern-
mental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some par-
ents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.”
238
  The 
Court’s analysis therefore embodied the authorities framework’s primary con-
cern with assigning control over children to parents or the state. Accordingly, the 
Court’s limited consideration of children’s interests simply gave way to parental 
rights. 
Our tripartite framework, in contrast, emphasizes many factors left un-
addressed by the Parham Court: the responsibility of parents to make every ef-
fort to provide for noninstitutional care; the effect that commitment might have 
on a child’s sense of being loved and wanted; children’s interests in relationships 
with people other than their parents, including siblings and peers; the duty of 
mental health professionals to keep children out of institutional care unless nec-
essary; and children’s interest in engaging with others in the world. When 
viewed in this way, Parham becomes less about authority over children and more 
about children’s relationships (with parents, doctors, siblings, and peers) inter-
secting with adult responsibilities to provide services to children, and the affirm-
ative rights children may have to claim those services. A court applying our 
 
234. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
235. Id. at 606-07. 
236. Id. at 602. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 603. 
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framework would therefore likely conclude that children’s broader interests jus-
tify both some kind of formal hearing as well as the provision of outpatient men-
tal health services before commitment. 
A. Relationships 
A broad range of relationships beyond parent-child relationships are deserv-
ing of the law’s support because they are often essential to children’s well-being, 
both in the present and over time. Support of such relationships will necessarily 
affect the current doctrine of parental rights, and we thus begin by analyzing 
how our framework would support children’s relationships with their parents 
and then move to children’s relationships more broadly. This Section draws 
heavily on children’s broader interests in relationships as set out in Part II above, 
but also from the full array of children’s interests to the extent nonparental rela-
tionships often further children’s exposure to new ideas, development of iden-
tity, protection from harm, and participation in civic life. 
1. With Parents 
The parent-child relationship is most children’s ﬁrst and primary relation-
ship, often serving as a model for future relationships in their lives. Because of 
children’s need for attachment and care, this early relationship is vital to chil-
dren’s present well-being as well as to their future development.
239
 Our frame-
work therefore seeks to foster healthy and ongoing relationships between chil-
dren and their parents. To this extent, we embrace the authorities framework’s 
assumption that children’s interests are best served when their parental relation-
ships are not disrupted by the state.
240
 
At the same time, our framework also encompasses a more expansive con-
ception of the parent-child relationship that goes beyond parental control of 
children’s upbringing. Aspects of family law doctrine have suggested that parent-
child interactions encompass more than parental authority,
241
 but legal scholars 
 
239. See GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 121, at 22 (offering a “psychological parent” the-
ory). 
240. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 13 (arguing that parental authority has strong constitutional protec-
tions). 
241. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (suggesting that Amish children might be able to veto their parents’ edu-
cational decisions). 
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for the most part have not explored alternative conceptions of this relation-
ship.
242
 Even scholars who promote children’s rights tend to focus on ways to 
reduce parental control rather than exploring conceptualizations of the parent-
child relationship that go beyond control.
243
 Our framework, in contrast, values 
parent-child relationships for how they enrich children’s present lives as well as 
meet their developmental needs for care and guidance. 
Our focus on the diverse ways parents enrich children’s lives has several im-
plications for the legal regulation of the parent-child relationship. In some in-
stances, promoting children’s broader interests in the parent-child relationship 
will better insulate parent-child relationships from disruption by the state. Ex-
isting laws in many states, for example, subsume parental failure to protect chil-
dren from third-party harm into deﬁnitions of parental abuse or neglect.
244
 Such 
conﬂation overly intrudes on the parent-child relationship by unduly extending 
the consequences of an abuse or neglect ﬁnding, including removal from the 
home on a ﬁnding of failure to protect.
245
 We recognize concerns surrounding 
parental failure to protect children from third-party harm, but we distinguish 
that harm from direct parental harm. Most importantly, because the parent-child 
relationship is important to children’s interests in the here and now, failure to 
protect a child from third-party harm should never be the sole basis for removing 
a child from the custody of a parent who is not directly harming the child. State 
intervention in this context should be geared toward alleviating the harm caused 
by the third party while preserving the parent-child relationship.
246
 
 
242. In contrast to the parent-child context, in the marriage context legal scholars have engaged in 
spirited theoretical discussions about the nature of marriage, playing a role in changing tradi-
tional conceptions of marriage within both scholarly discourse and how family law is practiced 
on the ground. See Rosenbury, supra note 109. 
243. For one example, see Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood, supra note 15. 
244. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-904(B)(9)-(10) (West 2009). 
245. Existing law authorizes such removal in an effort to punish parents or to send a message that 
parents (often mothers) must take greater care in supervising their children. See Justine A. 
Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for 
Failure To Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565 (2004); Dara E. Purvis, The Rules of Maternity, 84 TENN. 
L. REV. 367, 402-10 (2017) (discussing the “rule of motherhood” that “mothers must always 
protect”); Rebecca Ann Schernitzki, What Kind of Mother Are You? The Relationship Between 
Motherhood, Battered Woman Syndrome and Missouri Law, 56 J. MO. B. 50, 52 (2000) (“By stra-
tegically placing women into the categories of ‘good mother’ and ‘bad mother,’ society can 
easily advocate the position that bad mothers deserve to be punished when they ‘allow their 
children to be abused’ at the hands of another.”). 
246. Such intervention might include separating the child from the third party, providing counsel-
ing for both the parent and the child, or even some limited supervision of the home. If a parent 
fails to prevent or end the harm caused by the third party after this intervention, additional 
state intervention may be warranted under statutes and doctrine governing direct parental 
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At other times, situating the parent-child relationship within a larger web of 
children’s relationships and interests will limit existing parental rights. Our 
framework weighs children’s interests in having parents exercise exclusive con-
trol over their upbringing against children’s interests in maintaining close ties to 
other children and adults, in being exposed to new ideas, in expressing their 
identity, in protecting their personal integrity and privacy, and in participating 
in civic life. This balancing of children’s broader interests may limit some of the 
prerogatives that parents currently enjoy under the authorities framework. 
For example, under the existing doctrine of parental rights, parents may con-
trol their children’s social relationships, including by denying the visitation 
needed to maintain existing relationships. Our framework suggests that this pre-
rogative should not be so absolute. Parents and other caregivers should have the 
right to exclude other adults from access to their children in their earliest months 
and years because children ﬂourish when early attachment relationships are sta-
ble, secure, and long-term.
247
 Yet as children grow, so too does their interest in 
life beyond the family. Children have independent interests—not derivative of 
third-party interests or rights—in developing and maintaining relationships 
with nonparental ﬁgures, such as other relatives, foster parents, stepparents, sib-
lings, and other children.
248
 Children’s interests in maintaining such relation-
ships may thus justify access to these third parties over the objection of custodial 
parents in proceedings brought by either adults or the state, such as divorce, 
immigration, visitation, or delinquency hearings.
249
 
In these ways and more, our tripartite framework posits a more expansive 
conception of the parent-child relationship that goes beyond parental control of 
children’s upbringing. By situating children’s interests in maintaining the par-
ent-child relationship within a larger web of relationships and interests, we value 
 
neglect. Until such direct maltreatment is established, however, children’s interests in main-
taining their relationships with parents should be paramount. 
247. See 1-3 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS (1997-98); GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra 
121. 
248. AM. LAW INST., supra note 138, at 203. 
249. See Buss, supra note 13. In such cases, judges should weigh the impact of recognizing these 
third-party relationships on the child’s relationship with her parents. Such consideration may 
very well dictate different outcomes in cases like Troxel and Michael H. In Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 
(2000), a court utilizing our framework might very well have found that the children’s best 
interests lay with seeing the grandparents more often than the mother wanted, thus overrid-
ing her parental rights. Certainly, in Michael H., 492 U.S. 937 (1989), where the biological 
father was denied any right to see his daughter, a court under our framework would carefully 
weigh the child’s interest in maintaining a relationship she had already developed with her 
biological father along with her interest in her relationship with her mother. 
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parent-child relationships not in service to parental autonomy or control but be-
cause of the multiple ways these relationships further children’s broader inter-
ests. 
2. With Children and Other Adults 
A focus on children’s broader interests also opens the door to describing and 
reforming law’s regulation of children’s relationships with a range of other actors 
in children’s lives. Our framework seeks to acknowledge and further children’s 
interests in a range of relationships with siblings; peers; grandparents and other 
kin; former foster care parents; biological parents post-adoption; teachers, 
counselors, mentors, and coaches; and even certain professionals, including doc-
tors, therapists, social workers, and lawyers. 
To begin, recognizing and promoting children’s relationships with other 
children is a core concern of our new framework. Part II describes how the au-
thorities framework generally overlooks sibling relationships, although there are 
promising developments in this area. State legislatures and the federal govern-
ment have begun efforts to preserve the sibling relationship when children are 
removed from the home.
250
 While these developments should be applauded, our 
approach calls for an even more full-bodied recognition of the positive dimen-
sion of sibling relationships in the context of custody, foster care, removal, adop-
tion, and immigration proceedings. 
Our new framework also recognizes the importance of children’s relation-
ships with children who are not their siblings. Positive peer relationships are vi-
tal aspects of children’s lives in the here and now.
251
 They enrich and diversify 
children’s experiences of forming and navigating relationships, help expose chil-
dren to new ideas, and further children’s exploration of their identities.
252
 Past 
attempts to recognize these peer relationships have focused on children’s auton-
omous desires to the exclusion of their other interests. For example, some schol-
ars have suggested that at least older children should be extended the right to 
intimate association currently enjoyed by adults.
253
 Scholars thus have urged 
that children should be permitted to maintain peer relationships even in the face 
 
250. See supra note 157. 
251. See supra discussion in Part II. 
252. See supra discussion in Part II. 
253. Not all horizontal relationships between adults are affirmatively recognized by the state, but 
all are protected against undue state interference through the right to intimate association. 
This protection extends to non-sexual associations, including friendship. See Karst, supra note 
127, at 629-37 & n.26; Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Beneﬁts?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 202-
03 (2007). 
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of parental disapproval.
254
 Such rights-based proposals recognize children’s in-
terest in relationships with other children only when they are old enough to be 
sufficiently like adults, reinforcing most children’s dependency to the exclusion 
of their present interests. Moreover, children’s peer relationships generally re-
quire some assistance from parents, even if solely in the form of providing back-
ground conditions such as transportation and permission to leave the home.
255
 
Proposals to extend older children relationship rights ignore this critical differ-
ence when they ask the state to protect children’s relationship choices against the 
wishes of their parents.
256
 A relationship between two children that is against 
the will of the parents and is “left alone” by the state will often be impossible for 
the children to maintain. 
Our framework therefore calls for new ways of recognizing and protecting 
children’s peer relationships in some contexts. With respect to custody proceed-
ings, for example, states could develop guidelines for considering children’s peer 
relationships when a parent with primary custody of a child attempts to relocate 
against the wishes of the noncustodial parent.
257
 Currently, judges in these cases 
typically evaluate children’s best interests by considering what amounts to two 
factors: the potential beneﬁts of the move for the custodial family and the child’s 
ability to maintain ties with the nonrelocating parent.
258
 Although children in 
 
254. As such, children would be able to appeal to a judge if their parents failed to respect those 
rights. See, e.g., DWYER, supra note 114, at 16-17; Meyer, supra note 156, at 1127-29. 
255. Adult relationships, in contrast, generally require no assistance from third parties other than 
limited enablement from the state in the form of being left alone. 
256. See, e.g., DWYER, supra note 114, at 94 (putting forward one version of children’s relationship 
rights, modeled after those of incompetent adults, in which “the child would have a presump-
tive right to choose with which third parties he or she would associate, a right that a guardian 
could overcome only by showing that the child’s choice would likely result in harm”). 
257. As in the abuse and neglect context, a consideration of children’s horizontal relationships 
would rarely be dispositive of the issue at hand. Judges would still evaluate multiple factors 
beyond children’s peer relationships to reach their relocation decisions, much like judges in 
abuse and neglect cases primarily focus on children’s general safety and welfare when deter-
mining whether the state should remove a child from the home or terminate parental rights. 
But by addressing the ways such determinations affect children’s peer relationships, judges 
would also recognize the ways children interact outside of parent-child relationships even as 
those vertical relationships govern large aspects of children’s lives. 
258. For a summary of these approaches, see generally Ciesluk v. Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2005). 
This focus is generally true of the scholarly literature on relocation as well. Compare Judith S. 
Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not To Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in 
the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305 (1996) (arguing for a presump-
tion in favor of relocation), with Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development 
Research To Make Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children, 38 FAM. & CON-
CILIATION CTS. REV. 297 (2000) (reviewing research on the attachment processes, separation 
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these situations will also be moving away from other important individuals in 
their lives—including other children—judges generally do not take those poten-
tial losses into account when making relocation decisions.
259
 Older children are 
often not even asked for their views about the move.
260
 Under the new frame-
work, judges might take into account children’s interests in maintaining such 
peer relationships as one factor in their relocation analysis. Such interests will 
rarely be dispositive, but they should be considered and protected when possible. 
Our focus on a broader range of children’s relationships with other children 
is a clear departure from the authorities framework, but this focus does not ne-
cessitate signiﬁcantly expanded state intervention in family life. There are mul-
tiple routes short of direct intervention that states might take to better facilitate 
children’s interactions with other children. For example, states could adopt edu-
cational curricula that emphasize the beneﬁts of peer learning. States could also 
require public schools to open their doors for after-school youth activities, in-
cluding those run largely by other children. Schools could begin peer mediation 
programs. Local governments could also create more playgrounds and other rec-
reational spaces for children and ensure their security and safety. 
The new law of the child also supports more fundamental shifts with respect 
to children’s relationships with adults other than their parents. Children’s rela-
tionships with paid caregivers might be recognized in certain contexts, for ex-
ample. The authorities framework treats such relationships as mere employment 
relationships, ignoring the close bonds that children may form with their care-
givers.
261
 Our framework instead seeks to foster those bonds, although not nec-
essarily by bestowing legally enforceable rights on paid caregivers. Instead, 
 
from attachment ﬁgures, and the roles of mothers and fathers in promoting psychosocial ad-
justment in children) and Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children’s Best Interests in 
Relocation Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 FAM. L.Q. 83 (2000) (supporting a policy of encourag-
ing both parents to remain in close proximity to their children, in opposition to Wallerstein). 
For an important exception, see Merle H. Weiner, Inertia and Inequality: Reconceptualizing Dis-
putes over Parental Relocation, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1747 (2007), which details the relevance 
of the noncustodial parent’s mobility. 
259. Other scholars have emphasized that these approaches to relocation do not adequately address 
children’s interests. See generally Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the 
“Right” Thing To Do, 27 PACE L. REV. 869, 902-04 (2007); Patrick Parkinson, Family Law and 
the Indissolubility of Parenthood, 40 FAM. L.Q. 237, 262 (2006); Edwin J. Terry et al., Relocation: 
Moving Forward or Moving Backward?, 31 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 983, 1023-25 (2000); Weiner, 
supra note 258, at 1749-60. But these scholars have not acknowledged the potential harm to 
children’s relationships with other children. 
260. See Elrod, supra note 259, at 902-04. 
261. See Murray, supra note 90, at 387-94; Tali Schaefer, Disposable Mothers: Paid In-Home Caretak-
ing and the Regulation of Parenthood, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305, 322 (2008) (“[P]aid care-
takers are excluded from challenging parental authority and control over their children and 
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courts might take into account children’s interests in continued access to former 
caregivers when making custody and visitation decisions. 
Our approach also better promotes children’s interests in their relationships 
with foster parents. Under current law, foster parents—even where there are kin-
ship ties or placement has been since infancy—have few rights.
262
 The Supreme 
Court has indicated that any interest a foster parent might have is inferior to the 
interests of biological parents.
263
  Yet these relationships are quite important 
from the perspective of the child.
264
 When a child is placed in foster care at birth, 
or has resided with foster care parents for an extended period of time, the attach-
ment to a foster parent from the child’s point of view may be indistinguishable 
from the attachment to any other parental ﬁgure.
265
 In such circumstances, ef-
forts can and should be made to maintain a child’s primary attachment, while at 
the same time recognizing the child’s interest in maintaining ties to his or her 
biological parents. Foster parents are not a homogenous group; each case will 
present different issues depending on the type of proceeding, the kinship rela-
tionship, the duration of the foster care, and other factors. Our framework’s 
child-centric approach does not guarantee that a child will always have access to 
a former foster parent, but rather that children’s broader interests in these rela-
tionships will be taken into account when a court is determining custody or vis-
itation issues. 
The tripartite framework thereby situates children within a web of diverse 
relationships, each with the potential to further their well-being. These relation-
ships go well beyond the parent-child relationship but by no means displace it. 
Unlike the authorities framework, the new law of the child aims to balance chil-
dren’s interests in maintaining close parental ties within a web of broader rela-
tionships. 
 
therefore pose no threat.”). For one exception, see Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Money, Caregiving, 
and Kinship: Should Paid Caregivers Be Allowed To Obtain De Facto Parental Status?, 74 MO. L. 
REV. 25, 31 (2009), which argues that paid childcare providers should not be automatically 
excluded from petitioning for de facto legal status. 
262. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846-47 (1977) (assuming 
but not holding that foster parents have a constitutionally protected interest in maintaining a 
relationship with their foster children). 
263. Id. 
264. See, e.g., Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children To Maintain 
Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 384 (1994) (“[C]ourts have ne-
glected to examine the possibility and reality of a loving and caring relationship between a 
child and a legally unrelated adult and to preserve that relationship by employing a child-
centered approach.”). 
265. Id. at 383. 
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B. Responsibilities 
Our framework next focuses on adult responsibilities for children, including 
the responsibilities of the state, parents, and other adults in children’s lives. Un-
der the authorities framework, the issue of adult responsibilities for children is 
left largely unexamined.
266
 The state confers a range of beneﬁts on children, but 
these are generally considered a matter of discretion rather than duty. To the ex-
tent the authorities framework addresses parental responsibilities, these duties 
are usually understood to be derivative of parental rights of control.
267
 Indeed, 
parental rights often operate so as to prevent the articulation of adult duties to 
children. Parents are not tasked with speciﬁc responsibilities to their children—
beyond providing basic necessities—in large part because spelling out parental 
duties is at odds with the freedom from governmental control that deﬁnes pa-
rental rights in the ﬁrst place.
268
 
The new tripartite framework, in contrast, addresses the multiple ways adult 
responsibilities for children can and should foster a collaborative relationship 
between parents and the state.
269
 The authorities framework rests on the prem-
ise that parents have the fundamental due process right to direct their children’s 
upbringing free from governmental control.
270
  This underlying entitlement 
casts the relationship between parents and the state as predominately one of con-
ﬂict.
271
 Parents and the state become locked in battle for control over children, 
obscuring the possibility that parents and the state are and should be engaged in 
a joint enterprise of caregiving for children. 
 
266. Dailey, supra note 13, at 2169 (“The Supreme Court has recognized some affirmative consti-
tutional rights . . . but for the most part the Constitution is treated as a charter of negative 
liberties.”). 
267. The Supreme Court has recognized “[t]he linkage between parental duty and parental right,” 
quite clearly stating that “the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they 
have assumed.” Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983). Parents carry the affirmative ob-
ligation to raise their children and are protected while doing so by the doctrine of parental 
rights. If parents lose their rights, they generally are relieved of the duty to support their chil-
dren. For instance, the parent of an emancipated minor loses any duty to support the child at 
the same time that they lose their parental rights. Emancipation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(9th ed. 2009); see also Maria Roumiantseva, Note, Because Parents Owe It to Them: Unaccom-
panied LGBTQ Youth Enforcing the Parental Duty of Support, 16 CUNY L. REV. 363, 373-75 
(2013). 
268. See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATION-
SHIPS 100 (2014). 
269. Cf. id. at 152. 
270. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
271. See infra Section III.B.1. 
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Our emphasis on adult responsibilities shares some characteristics with 
scholarly approaches that analogize parents to trustees or otherwise reconceptu-
alize the parent-child relationship as a ﬁduciary relationship.
272
 Like our frame-
work, a theory of parents as trustees or ﬁduciaries elevates children’s interests 
over parental rights and focuses on parental duties. Yet trustee and ﬁduciary 
models have their limitations. Although the concept of trusteeship may be de-
ployed to establish a legal obligation to put children’s ﬁnancial interests ﬁrst, it 
does not address the totality of children’s experiences. Similarly, a ﬁduciary 
model emphasizes parental responsibilities but does not specify the content of 
those responsibilities. More fundamentally, theories of trusteeship and ﬁduciary 
relationships function on a much smaller scale. While these theories remain nar-
rowly focused on the parent-child relationship, our approach calls for a new way 
of thinking about adult responsibilities as part of a broader framework encom-
passing the relationships, responsibilities, and rights of children and the adults 
in their lives. 
Other scholars focus on parental and state duties to care for children.
273
 Yet 
these scholars argue for the importance of recognizing and developing law’s 
treatment of children—particularly young children—as vulnerable individuals in 
need of support, care, and protection.
274
 Although framed in terms of children’s 
welfare or adult duties to children, the attention to hierarchical relationships of 
control continues unabated, as does the question of which adults—parents or 
state—carry responsibilities for children. These scholars do focus a certain 
amount of attention on children’s needs rather than adult authority, but the pre-
vailing emphasis on children’s dependency is essentially unchallenged, pitting 
parents against the state in addressing children’s needs. 
Drawing on children’s broader interests, our framework instead focuses on 
the shared responsibilities of parents and the state to (1) nurture healthy and safe 
relationships with parents and others; (2) educate children; (3) rehabilitate chil-
dren who engage in misconduct; and (4) foster children’s participation in the 
wider world. Of course, these areas of responsibility will often overlap. For ex-
ample, caregiving also encompasses responses to children’s misconduct, juvenile 
justice frequently intersects with education, and children’s market participation 
 
272. See, e.g., Connie K. Beck et. al., The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 
669, (1978); Scott & Scott, supra note 13. 
273. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 13. 
274. WOODHOUSE, supra note 13. 
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implicates protection of their welfare. Taken together, these four spheres of re-
sponsibility highlight the many ways our framework seeks to promote shared 
parental-state duties toward children.
275
 
1. Caregiving and Protection 
Like the authorities framework, our framework assigns responsibility for 
children’s caregiving and protection to parents because the parental relationship, 
whether actual or inchoate, is vital to children’s present well-being and develop-
ment.
276
 Our approach emphasizes, however, that other adults, such as unmar-
ried partners of legal parents, guardians, and stepparents, may also willingly take 
on responsibilities for children by developing actual caregiving relationships 
with them, either alongside parents or to ﬁll gaps in the parent-child relation-
ship. We also maintain the prevailing legal presumption that parents and these 
other custodial caregivers—rather than other adults or the state
277
—are strongly 
motivated to carry out primary caretaking duties and should provide physical, 
emotional, ﬁnancial, and other support for children. 
Additionally, our framework highlights that parents and custodial caregivers 
have a responsibility to allow and encourage children to develop relationships 
with peers and other adults, as identiﬁed in the previous Section. Although cus-
todial relationships are crucial to children’s well-being and future development, 
custodians are unable to provide certain emotional, intellectual, and social ben-
eﬁts that children derive from relationships with adults and peers outside the 
family. The new framework therefore encourages parents and other custodians 
 
275. Most of these duties would fall to state and local governments. Federalism serves to protect 
against the risks of totalitarian authority that arise when a single government assumes exclu-
sive control over children’s upbringing. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) 
(rejecting the “power of the state to standardize its children”); see also Anne C. Dailey, Feder-
alism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1858 (1995) (defending state sovereignty over chil-
dren’s rights). The federal government also has duties that speciﬁcally arise under the federal 
Constitution or statutes. Immigration, for example, is an area almost exclusively governed by 
federal law, although some immigration statutes look to state law. See Special Immigrant Ju-
venile, 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2016). But in almost all cases, the responsibilities for children’s care-
giving, education, protection, and rehabilitation will be shared by federal and state govern-
ments. When we refer to “the state,” therefore, we mean to invoke all levels of governmental 
authority. 
276. Cf. Buss, supra note 13, at 651 (arguing that “parental identity derives not from any set of 
individual characteristics, but rather from the parent-child relationship itself and, more par-
ticularly, the centrality of the relationship in the child’s life”). 
277. See id. at 647 (noting that “the state’s knowledge of and commitment to any particular child 
is relatively thin”). 
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to loosen the reins of their authority as children grow, allowing children to ex-
pand their relationships in the broader world. 
For example, parents have duties to protect children from harm. Our ap-
proach would raise questions about religious exemption laws that allow parents 
to deny medical care to children on the ground that it violates parents’ religious 
beliefs.
278
 Indeed, under the new tripartite framework, states might impose a 
duty on parents to certify that their children are seen by a medical professional 
at least once a year. Our approach would also interrogate more closely parental 
bodily intrusions, such as circumcision,
279
 cosmetic surgery and hormone ther-
apy,
280
 and so-called normalization surgery for intersex infants,
281
 each of which 
affect children’s broader interests in personal integrity and the ways they experi-
ence their bodies. 
The state also shares responsibility for ensuring that children are protected 
from harm in ways that do not unduly disrupt children’s relationships with their 
primary caregivers and others.
282
 Although state involvement in a child’s custo-
dial care is usually triggered by a breakdown in custodial care, and is perhaps 
rarely welcomed, our framework emphasizes that state intervention need not al-
ways be adversarial. State intervention can be—and often is—supportive of cus-
todial relationships.
283
 When primary caregivers struggle, state services should 
 
278. For an overview of religious exemption laws, see Aleksandra Sandstrom, Most States Allow 
Religious Exemptions from Child Abuse and Neglect Laws, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 12, 2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/12/most-states-allow-religious 
-exemptions-from-child-abuse-and-neglect-laws [http://perma.cc/464C-Q5DX]. 
279. See Peter W. Adler, Is Circumcision Legal?, 16 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 439, 451-65 (2013); William 
E. Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional Issues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337, 
340-43 (1984). 
280. See Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority over Children’s Bodies, 85 IND. L.J. 955, 959-65 
(2010). 
281. See M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. Amrhein, 598 Fed. App’x 143 (4th Cir. 2015) (dismissing an in-
tersex plaintiff ’s complaint after normalization surgery because the child’s rights were not 
clearly established); Robert Hupf, Allyship to the Intersex Community on Cosmetic, Non-Consen-
sual Genital “Normalizing” Surgery, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73 (2015). 
282. Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-67 (1982) (“[W]hile there is still reason to believe 
that positive, nurturing parent-child relationships exist, the parens patriae interest favors 
preservation, not severance, of natural familial bonds.”). 
283. Under existing child welfare laws, the state is required to make reasonable efforts to keep 
families together and bring about a rapid reuniﬁcation where possible. Federal law also re-
quires the state to take steps toward terminating parental rights after children have been in 
foster care for ﬁfteen of the prior twenty-two months. After twenty-two months, a child’s 
attachment might well develop with a new caretaker. See, e.g., Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (requiring that the state make 
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be provided to help parents improve their caregiving skills, rather than removing 
children from the home.
284
 Although the risks of keeping children with abusive 
custodians are great, removal from nonabusive custodians also has potentially 
grave consequences,
285
  particularly since children are often consequently re-
moved from their network of siblings, relatives, friends, and peers. It is only 
when there is no real prospect of maintaining children’s custodial attachments, 
or when their safety is clearly at risk, that removal from primary caregivers is 
warranted.
286
 If the state must remove children, it should take steps to maintain 
children’s ties to siblings, other relatives, stepparents, friends, and teachers.
287
 
For the same reason, the state has a duty to take children’s caregiving inter-
ests into account in other contexts as well. Criminal sentencing, for example, 
may seriously strain children’s relationships with incarcerated caregivers,
288
 as 
 
reasonable efforts to reunite families); Jane Spinak, When Did Lawyers for Children Stop Read-
ing Goldstein, Freud and Solnit? Lessons from the Twentieth Century on Best Interests and the Role 
of the Child Advocate, 41 FAM. L. Q. 393, 397-98 (2007); Lois A Weithorn, Developmental Neu-
roscience, Children’s Relationships with Primary Caregivers, and Child Protection Policy Reform, 63 
HASTINGS L.J. 1487, 1512 (2012). 
284. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 268, at 224 (“[T]he state needs to adopt a fundamentally differ-
ent approach to family law that carefully targets intervention at the most critical junctures 
where families need support.”); ROBERTS, supra note 13, at 267-68 (“The very structure of 
child welfare is fundamentally ﬂawed . . . . Instead of supporting families, it punishes them 
by taking children from their homes for placement in foster care. Redressing this racial harm 
requires placing greater control over child welfare services in Black communities, addressing 
the deprivation of poor and minority families, and eliminating the coercive function of a sys-
tem that is supposed to serve them.”). 
285. See Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care—In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599 (1973); 
Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards for Removal of 
Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of 
Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976). 
286. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767 n.17 (“Any parens patriae interest in terminating the natural par-
ents’ rights arises only at the dispositional phase, after the parents have been found unﬁt.” 
(emphasis omitted)). As emphasized in the previous Section, children should be removed 
from the home only when parents or custodians are directly harming children, rather than 
when they are failing to protect them from third-party harm. See supra text accompanying 
notes 244-246. 
287. For example, foster care that emphasizes kinship placement may reﬂect, reinforce, and further 
children’s basic attachment ties with their family of origin. See Megan M. O’Laughlin, Note, 
A Theory of Relativity: Kinship Foster Care May Be the Key To Stopping the Pendulum of Termina-
tions vs. Reuniﬁcation, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1427, 1451-52 (1998). 
288. Incarceration separates the parent and child during the time of incarceration and, in many 
states, may be cause to terminate parental rights. See Deseriee A. Kennedy, “The Good Mother”: 
Mothering, Feminism, and Incarceration, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 161 (2012). 
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may the deportation of parents under the federal immigration laws.
289
 And trea-
ties like the Hague Convention, which governs international custody disputes, 
may be applied in ways that disrupt custodial ties.
290
 
Finally, our framework also affirms that many adults in the community other 
than caregivers or state actors have, or should have, legal obligations to protect 
children from harm. Existing law imposes affirmative duties to report child 
abuse and neglect on teachers, doctors, nurses, therapists, and other profession-
als.
291
 Lawyers for minor children have special duties, as do guardians ad litem.
292
 
Psychiatrists must make an independent assessment before parents can commit 
a child to a public psychiatric hospital.
293
 Employers have duties not to employ 
minors under certain circumstances.
294
 Shopkeepers have duties not to sell alco-
hol, cigarettes, or pornography to minors, and any adult can be criminally liable 
for providing a child with alcohol or drugs.
295
 Sellers must adhere to special rules 
when advertising to children
296
 and collecting personal information online about 
children,
297 
and banks and other ﬁnancial actors must know when they are deal-
ing with minors.
298
 All adults also have the duty not to engage in sexual relations 
 
289. David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV. 
L.J. 1165 (2006). 
290. See, e.g., Janet Chiancone, Linda Girdner & Patricia Hoff, Issues in Resolving Cases of Interna-
tional Child Abduction by Parents, Juvenile Justice Bulletin (Dec. 2001). 
291. See Children’s Bureau, Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS. 1-2 (2016), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2C8Y-X5W9] (summarizing state laws on professionals required to report). 
292. See JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHI-
CAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS (2d ed. 2001); Barbara Ann Atwood, The Uniform Represen-
tation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act: Bridging the Divide Between 
Pragmatism and Idealism, 42 FAM. L.Q. 63 (2008). 
293. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-08 (1979). 
294. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 212 (2012) (prohibiting oppressive child labor). In some employment 
contexts, such as the entertainment industry, a child may work only under strict regulations, 
and employers are responsible for following these laws. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-12-104 
(West 2017); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/8.1 (West 2018). 
295. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1470 (2012) (providing that knowing transfers of obscene material to a 
minor below the age of sixteen may result in imprisonment for up to ten years). 
296. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding a city 
ordinance that regulated alcohol advertisements in areas minor children were likely to fre-
quent). The federal Children’s Television Act of 1990 also imposes requirements for advertis-
ing appearing during programming targeting children. Children’s Television Act of 1990 
§ 102, 47 U.S.C. § 303a (2012). 
297. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2012). 
298. See, e.g., FDIC Rules, § 1020.100(c)(1)(2)(A). 
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with a minor; because statutory rape is a strict liability crime, it imposes a re-
sponsibility on adults to verify their partner’s age. Our new framework incorpo-
rates these responsibilities of noncaregiving adults into a cohesive structure con-
sistent with the custodial and state responsibilities discussed above and lays the 
groundwork for articulating and expanding these adult duties to children. 
2. Education 
The tripartite framework imposes responsibilities on both caregivers and the 
state to ensure that children are afforded a meaningful educational experience, 
one that fosters children’s present well-being as well as their development over 
time.
299
 As traditionally understood, school provides children with a place for 
intellectual study, social engagement, and democratic socialization.
300
 Schools 
teach children to express their ideas and beliefs and to think critically. Courts 
have readily recognized these traditional educational goals as legitimate and de-
sirable.
301
 Less considered are the ways in which schools provide children with 
opportunities to develop relationships with adults and children outside their 
families, as well as expose children to ideas outside the home. Schools also pro-
vide spaces for play, mentorship, and peer friendships. 
Our framework views children’s education as a sphere of shared responsibil-
ities rather than a contest between parents and the state for control over chil-
dren’s upbringing. Parents and other custodial caregivers generally provide foun-
dational learning experiences for children prior to formal education, but the state 
can better support parents in this task. Our framework’s reinforcement of adult 
responsibilities to children opens up space to advocate for state funding of early 
educational interventions in the form of high-quality daycare and preschool.
302
 
 
299. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982) (“Today, education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments.” (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954))). 
300. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969); Brown, 347 U.S. 
483; see also Dailey, supra note 78, at 458 (explaining that social and legal commentators “iden-
tify schools as the place where the reasoning skills of democratic citizenship are cultivated”). 
301. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“The American people have always 
regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which 
should be diligently promoted.”). 
302. See James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 49 (2006). Studies 
have also shown that early investment may yield substantial long-term savings for the state. 
See James Heckman et al., Understanding the Mechanisms Through Which an Inﬂuential Early 
Childhood Program Boosted Adult Outcomes, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2052 (2013); Katherine A. 
Magnuson et al., Inequality in Preschool Education and School Readiness, 41 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 
115, 144 (2004). 
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Most states start their public educational programs with part-day kindergarten 
classes for children when they reach the age of ﬁve, but this entry into formal 
schooling comes too late for many children.
303
 Although the most privileged 
children do not suffer from delayed school, presumably because their parents 
have the resources to provide them with private daycare, other children suffer 
because most parents struggle to ﬁnd affordable preschool programs.
304
 School-
ing that begins at age ﬁve thus sets in place an invisible barrier to equality in 
education that contributes to a life-long achievement gap between the rich and 
poor.
305
 By more fully funding high-quality daycare and preschool, states may 
better support caregivers while also accepting more direct responsibility for 
providing meaningful education experiences for all children. 
Our approach also imposes responsibilities on caregivers and the state to en-
sure that children are exposed to new ideas and ways of life when they are at 
school. The Supreme Court has not overlooked the value of exposing children 
to a diversity of viewpoints in school. In Tinker, for example, the Court observed 
that free speech is not enjoyed in isolation, but through communication with 
other students “in the cafeteria, or on the playing ﬁeld, or on the campus during 
the authorized hours.”
306
 Our framework builds on the Supreme Court’s recog-
nition that children beneﬁt from a broad range of experiences in school tied to 
their intellectual learning, their relationships with others, and their exposure to 
new ideas.
 
There are multiple ways of exposing children to diverse viewpoints at school, 
but children must ﬁrst be at school to beneﬁt from that exposure. In contrast to 
the authorities framework, which gives wide latitude to parents seeking to 
homeschool their children, our new framework—with its attention to children’s 
broader interests—would support the general prohibition of homeschooling for 
children beyond the primary grades.
307
 Some allowance should of course be 
made for children with special needs, for example, elite athletes or children with 
 
303. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTION (Jack P. Shonkoff & Samuel J. 
Meisels eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
304. Currently, states that fund such programs cannot guarantee children spots if they are eligible, 
with most states serving less than half of the intended population. See Magnuson et al., supra 
note 302, at 119. 
305. The federal Head Start Program is designed in part to address this educational disparity, but 
the program has suffered from inadequate funding and resources and there seems to be a lack 
of consistent research gauging the program’s effectiveness. See id. at 123-24. For more discus-
sion of these issues, see Clare Huntington, Early Childhood Development and the Law, 90 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 755 (2017). 
306. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969). 
307. Cf. Martha Albertson Fineman & George Shepherd, Homeschooling: Choosing Parental Rights 
over Children’s Interests, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 57 (2016) (arguing that homeschooling should be 
prohibited). 
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severe developmental disabilities. But homeschooling should not be allowed as 
a matter of right for families that wish to shield their children from outside in-
ﬂuences. Custodians and the state under our framework have a shared responsi-
bility to afford children some opportunity to engage in the broader world as they 
grow, and schools outside of the home are vital to that effort. Even though home-
schooling may be appropriate for younger children, increased regulation of the 
curriculum of such homeschools will ensure that these children beneﬁt from ex-
periences outside the home. 
3. Rehabilitation 
Custodial caregivers and the state should also share responsibility for ad-
dressing children’s misconduct, both inside and outside the home. Our frame-
work posits rehabilitation as the primary justiﬁcation for the punishment of chil-
dren. Given children’s capacity for change and their predisposition to cognitive, 
emotional, and moral learning, rehabilitation should guide adult response to 
children’s misconduct.
308
 While deterrence and retributive goals have a role to 
play in children’s punishment, they should be secondary to rehabilitative aims. 
As we have already stressed, children are developing individuals with a unique 
capacity for change—ﬂexibility, plasticity, regenerativity of mind—that distin-
guishes them from the adults they will someday become.
309
 What might be set-
tled character in an adult is likely a transient behavioral stage for a child.
310
 
Our framework thus imposes on custodial caregivers a duty to direct their 
discipline of children toward rehabilitative aims consistent with children’s 
broader interests. Punishment in the home must respect children’s interests in 
bodily integrity and personal safety. Although over thirty countries ban corporal 
punishment of children, prevailing law in the United States permits “reasonable” 
corporal punishment in the service of parental discipline.
311
 Parental and other 
 
308. Cf. Anca Gheaus, The ‘Intrinsic Goods of Childhood’ and the Just Society, in THE NATURE OF CHIL-
DREN’S WELL-BEING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 35, 41 (Alexander Bagattini & Colin Macleod 
eds., 2015) (“So children, like adults, are rational beings; the difference between them is that 
children are better at imagining things while adults—who have the beneﬁt of experience and 
enhanced self-control—are better at turning imagination into reality.”). 
309. Id. 
310. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
311. See Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 147 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also State v. Lefevre, 117 P.3d 980 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). 
The parental discipline defense is available in abuse cases even where the defendant is not the 
legal parent of the child. See State v. Roman, 199 P.3d 57 (Haw. 2008). Corporal punishment 
is also allowed in school. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (upholding the practice 
of corporal punishment in public schools against Eighth Amendment challenges). 
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adult authority appear to be the primary justiﬁcation for this practice, for it is 
clear that corporal punishment has few beneﬁcial developmental effects.
312
 In-
stead, research strongly suggests that corporal punishment generally does not 
further children’s interests and may in fact thwart them.
313
 Corporal punishment 
thus should be prohibited in most, if not all, circumstances. Instead, caregivers 
under our framework have a responsibility to discipline their children in ways 
that foster children’s capacity for learning and growth, as well as respect their 
bodily integrity and personal safety. States may support caregivers in these ef-
forts by offering information about disciplinary techniques more consistent with 
children’s broader interests. 
Rehabilitative aims should also inform state actors’ responses to children’s 
misconduct outside of the home. Our framework provides justiﬁcations for re-
orienting the juvenile justice system to harness children’s heightened capacity for 
change through rehabilitation
314
 while at the same time ensuring children are 
protected by basic procedural rights. Accordingly, our framework imposes re-
sponsibilities on judges, prosecutors, and legislators to address children’s delin-
quent activities in a juvenile justice system oriented toward rehabilitation and 
the provision of services. These responsibilities would also generally prohibit the 
transfer of most children to the adult criminal justice system, which is often pri-
marily retributive in nature. Indeed, transfer to adult court fails to take account 
of empirical evidence showing children’s unique capacity for brain development 
and change,
315
 and the harsh sentencing that often results ignores the psycho-
logical vulnerability of adolescents to stressful environmental factors, such as 
peer violence, poverty, and parental abuse or neglect.
316
 The jurisdiction of the 
 
312. See Elizabeth T. Gershoff, More Harm Than Good: A Summary of Scientiﬁc Research on the In-
tended and Unintended Effects of Corporal Punishment on Children, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
31 (2010). 
313. See id. at 43-47; Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Susan H. Bitensky, The Case Against Corporal Punish-
ment of Children, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 231, 238-240 (2007). 
314. The system was originally designed to serve rehabilitative goals, but the system has become 
increasingly punitive in nature. See, e.g., Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida To Challenge 
Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99, 107 (2010) (noting that “many of the juvenile transfer 
laws were signiﬁcantly expanded during the 1990s as part of a ‘moral panic’ that seemed to 
take over the country”); Alison Powers, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Mandatory Sentencing 
of Juveniles Tried as Adults Without the Possibility of Youth as a Mitigating Factor, 62 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 241, 249 (2009). 
315. See supra text accompanying notes 309-310. 
316. Kimberly S. May, Shifting Away from Rehabilitation: State v. Ladd’s Equal Protection Challenge 
to Alaska’s Automatic Waiver Law, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 367, 384-85 (1998) (“The real harshness 
in treating youthful offenders as adults lies in the impact of adult sentences on a minor’s de-
velopment. . . . Juveniles incarcerated in prison are especially vulnerable to inmate violence 
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juvenile court might be extended past the age of majority in cases where older 
children commit serious crimes, but, under our approach, the primary goal of 
rehabilitation should still govern. 
Likewise, when a child is accused of a “status offense”—engaging in behavior 
that is unlawful only for children, such as disobeying parents, running away, 
truancy, violating a curfew, or drinking alcohol—the state should not automati-
cally punish or criminalize the offense.
317
 Instead, the state should work with 
parents or others in the community to help bring their child’s behavior under 
control through, for example, substance abuse programs, counseling, and after-
school activities. 
4. Civic Engagement 
Our framework also recognizes adult responsibilities to further children’s en-
gagement as members of society. The Supreme Court has long validated the idea 
that adults have the responsibility to foster children’s growth as future citi-
zens.
318
 In one of its earliest decisions on education, for example, the Court 
wrote: “The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him 
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize 
and prepare him for additional obligations.”
319
 And in one of its most signiﬁcant 
First Amendment cases, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the 
Court held that students could not be compelled to pledge allegiance to the 
ﬂag.
320
 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Jackson appealed to the state’s role 
in educating children for civic participation: “That they are educating the young 
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of 
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth 
to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”
321
 Nine 
years later, the decision in Brown v. Board of Education hinged on the importance 
of an equal education to children’s future well-being as workers and citizens.
322
 
 
and sexual assault, and have a high risk of contracting AIDS. The isolation associated with 
incarceration may breed mental illness or reinforce existing feelings of anger and alienation, 
and adult prisons lack treatment facilities that juvenile centers may be able to provide. Impris-
oned juveniles also have a high risk of suicide.”). 
317. Cf., Cynthia Godsoe, Contempt, Status, and the Criminalization of Non-Conforming Girls, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1091 (2014). 
318. See Dailey, supra note 13. 
319. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
320. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
321. Id. at 637. 
322. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
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And perhaps the Supreme Court’s most sustained analysis of adults’ duty to raise 
future members of society came in Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the Court elaborated 
on the qualities children need to participate as full adults in the life of the na-
tion.
323 
Although the prevailing focus on developing children’s capacities as future 
civic participants is important, it does not go far enough. Our framework em-
phasizes children’s status as full members of society as well as adults’ responsi-
bilities to support that status. The responsibility to foster children’s present en-
gagement as members of the broader society encompasses not only participation 
in school but also engagement in the world through part-time paid work, vol-
unteer activities, community sports, or political activism. 
Parents carry the primary responsibility for furthering children’s interests in 
engaging in the world through such civic opportunities. Moreover, because chil-
dren do not now have the right to vote, their parents have the obligation to rep-
resent children’s interests in the political process. But parents are not the only 
adults with responsibilities to further children’s civic participation interests. The 
state also has a responsibility to recognize and facilitate these interests. In par-
ticular, the state has a responsibility to help children overcome concrete barriers 
to participation through the provision of transportation, afterschool activities, 
and opportunities to work and engage in the political process. 
This conception of the state’s role in facilitating children’s broader engage-
ment also offers a new way of thinking about the state’s responsibility to provide 
children with access to reproductive healthcare, including contraception and 
abortion. Older children’s ability to attend school, to work, and to participate in 
political activities often turns on meaningful access to such care. Although the 
Supreme Court has held that states do not have a constitutional duty to provide 
abortion services to adults,
324
 our framework suggests that children’s status as 
children should yield a different constitutional standard. As explained below,
325
 
because children are always in the custody of someone—whether parents or the 
state—these custodians have affirmative obligations to children that go well be-
yond the state duties owed to adults. These obligations include an affirmative 
duty on the part of the state to ensure that children have access to reproductive 
healthcare free from parental vetoes, as well as duties to disseminate information 
about such services and cover their costs. 
 
323. 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). Plyler v. Doe, which extended education rights to undocumented 
immigrant children, also rested in part on the importance of education to these children’s po-
tential for becoming future citizens. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). 
324. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980). 
325. See infra Section III.C.1. 
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In some ways, all adult responsibilities for children may be categorized as 
duties to ensure children’s full civic membership. What we mean to emphasize 
here are the speciﬁc duties arising out of children’s broader interests in education 
and in social and political engagement. As we will discuss in Section III.C, the 
tripartite framework guarantees that some adult responsibilities give rise to cor-
responding affirmative rights for children. 
* * * 
While we have focused here on state and parental responsibilities, our new 
law of the child also opens the door to articulating and developing children’s re-
sponsibilities as children. The authorities framework risks treating children’s re-
sponsibilities as an on/off switch: either children are dependent and not respon-
sible for their behavior, or they are autonomous, responsible individuals. In 
contrast, the new law of the child brings out the ways in which children are re-
sponsible as children. Children have responsibilities to obey their parents, to at-
tend school, to refrain from tortious and criminal conduct, and to treat other 
children with respect. While there are synergies between our approach and the 
current regime of status offenses, the latter remains ﬁrmly wedded to enforcing 
parental control over children. In contrast, we aim to develop rules and institu-
tions to govern children’s status as dependent, yet responsible, individuals. 
In opening up avenues for children to engage in the broader society through 
school, work, and community and political activities, the new law of the child 
highlights children’s responsibilities to take advantage of these opportunities. 
Children’s own responsibilities would be fostered, for example, through school 
policies requiring participation in activities, juvenile justice dispositions mandat-
ing community service, and education programs for substance abuse, driving, 
and voting. 
C. Rights 
Our tripartite framework opens up new ways of thinking about children’s 
rights rooted in children’s broader interests as children. Under our framework, 
rights do not operate solely to protect older children against coercive state action 
or overbearing parents. While our approach posits that children’s rights encom-
pass some adult autonomy rights—such as the right to freedom of speech, to free 
exercise of religion, or to privacy, as well as some important criminal procedure 
rights—our approach tailors almost all of these agency rights to ﬁt children’s 
unique status as children. We also underscore the role of affirmative constitu-
tional rights in recognizing and protecting children’s interests in certain relation-
ships, services, opportunities, and experiences in the here and now. Children’s 
rights therefore reﬂect the many ways in which children are not merely lesser 
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adults, but rather are full members of society deserving of rights derived from 
their special status as children. 
Our approach to children’s rights therefore brings new conceptual clarity to 
the constitutional rights children currently enjoy and lays out new rights that 
children should enjoy. Under our framework, children’s rights have certain dis-
tinguishing features: they are rooted in children’s broader interests; they are dy-
namic, adapting across time to children’s evolving capacities and circumstances; 
they include affirmative entitlements to relationships, goods, and services; and 
they terminate upon reaching the relevant age of majority. Unlike children’s in-
terests, which generally come in as factors to be weighed in designing and ap-
plying legal rules, children’s rights are forceful claims either for or against state 
action. 
We divide children’s rights into three categories: affirmative rights to certain 
resources; agency rights specially crafted to meet children’s autonomy interests 
as they evolve over time; and rights to equality and procedural justice. Some of 
these rights exist under current constitutional doctrine, but many do not. We 
begin with the category of affirmative constitutional rights because this concept 
of rights is inextricably tied to adult responsibilities for children and most clearly 
implements children’s broader interests in the here and now. Children’s affirma-
tive claims on the state also depart most dramatically from the authorities frame-
work’s exclusive reliance on negative rights. 
1. Affirmative Rights 
Under the tripartite framework, some limited, but not insigniﬁcant, number 
of adult duties will give rise to affirmative rights enforceable in court. In this 
regard, our approach challenges existing assumptions about the Constitution as 
a charter of negative liberties. The Supreme Court has stated outright that chil-
dren have no affirmative rights, including no right to physical safety in the 
home,
326
 but that analysis ignores children’s special custodial status.
327
 We reject 
the classic liberal view that the federal Constitution is exclusively a charter of 
 
326. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1989). 
327. As the Supreme Court stated in Schall v. Martin, “juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some 
form of custody.” 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). 
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negative liberties.
328
 A constitutional regime of negative liberties for adults does 
not necessarily preclude recognition of affirmative rights for children.
329
 
The Court’s clearest pronouncement of the classic liberal view came in 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.
330
  In this case, 
Joshua DeShaney and his mother brought suit against the local department of 
social services arguing that Joshua had been denied his constitutional right to 
protection from abuse at the hands of his father.
331
 In rejecting the claim, the 
Supreme Court observed that “the Due Process Clauses generally confer no af-
ﬁrmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to 
secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not 
deprive the individual.”
332
 The Court recognized an exception to this general rule 
where “the State takes a person into custody and holds him there against his 
will,”
333
 but considered Joshua to be in the private custody of his father.
334
 
Under our framework, DeShaney was wrongly decided. By focusing on ear-
lier cases rejecting adults’ affirmative rights to housing, food, and medical 
care,
335
 the Supreme Court failed to consider the existence of children’s affirma-
tive rights grounded in their special status as children. Children are always in the 
custody of others, whether their parents or the state; they are also legally disa-
bled from taking steps to protect themselves. Based on these conditions, children 
have special claims to state protection in the home. In some cases, the Court has 
already come close to recognizing these entitlements, gesturing in the direction 
 
328. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2278-97 
(1990); Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1907 
(2001). 
329. See Dailey, supra note 13, at 2169. 
330. 489 U.S. 189. 
331. Id. at 193. The facts, as Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded, were “undeniably tragic.” Id. at 191. 
Joshua DeShaney’s father beat the four-year-old boy so severely that he suffered permanent 
brain damage. Id. at 193; see also Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court and a Life Barely Lived, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/opinion/the-supreme 
-court-and-a-life-barely-lived.html [http://perma.cc/9YEF-S98J] (describing the case’s leg-
acy). 
332. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196. 
333. Id. at 199-200. 
334. Id. at 201. The two dissenting opinions critiqued the decision on the ground that the state was 
deeply implicated in the violence against Joshua, having removed the boy from the father’s 
care originally and then having returned him despite being aware of the risks of doing so. Id. 
at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
335. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1971); 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970). 
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of granting children minimal entitlements to education
336
 and custody,
337
 alt-
hough never explicitly recognizing these as rights. Our framework would take 
the next step, unambiguously articulating that adult responsibilities for chil-
dren’s education and custody create corresponding rights to those services. 
Not all adult responsibilities will give rise to affirmative rights enforceable 
by children. But many will. Under our framework, children at a minimum have 
affirmative rights to custodial care, education, safety inside and outside the 
home, and rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system. But children’s affirmative 
rights might also be enforced in custody, delinquency, immigration, and other 
proceedings. In these contexts, where the state is already involved, children’s af-
ﬁrmative rights might extend to rights to relationships with siblings and peers; 
rights to be exposed to ideas and people outside the home; and rights of access 
to play, creative arts, sports, and other activities. Importantly, the existence of 
such broad affirmative rights does not mean that children will in all instances 
have the right to initiate judicial proceedings against the state. Rather, children’s 
affirmative rights may be satisﬁed by agency and other action. 
Children’s affirmative constitutional rights grant children access to certain 
goods and services not provided to adults. For example, under the authorities 
 
336. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (observing that public education “[is not] some 
governmental ‘beneﬁt’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation”). The 
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) is an important step in the direction of 
recognizing an entitlement to education. In Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, for 
example, the Supreme Court held under IDEA schools must offer an individualized educa-
tional program that is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate 
in light of the child’s circumstances,” which means more than “de minimis” progress. No. 15-
827, slip op. at 11, 14 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15 
-827_0pm1.pdf [http://perma.cc/PDE8-EY4Q]. Along the same lines, our proposed tripar-
tite framework imposes a responsibility on states to aim to provide an equal educational en-
vironment for all children. We acknowledge, however, that courts and lawmakers have diffi-
culty complying with constitutional demands. In Connecticut, a desegregation lawsuit ﬁled 
in 1989 is still being litigated as the parties seek to implement the state Supreme Court’s rul-
ing. See Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); Jacqueline Rabe Thomas & Jake Kara, 
Judge: Magnet Schools Cannot Be Made More Segregated, THE CONN. MIRROR (June 16, 2017), 
http://ctmirror.org/2017/06/16/judge-magnet-schools-cannot-be-made-more-segregated 
[http://perma.cc/YNB6-PSQ9]; Vanessa de la Torre, Left Behind: 20 Years After Sheff v. 
O’Neill, Students Struggle in Hartford’s Segregated Neighborhood Schools, HARTFORD COURANT 
(Mar. 12, 2017), http://www.courant.com/education/hc-sheff-left-behind-day-1-20170319 
-story.html [http://perma.cc/3VC6-76DJ]. 
337. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) (“The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the 
child procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the assertion that a child, 
unlike an adult, has a right ‘not to liberty but to custody.’”) (emphasis added); Schall v. Martin, 
467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (“Children, by deﬁnition, are not assumed to have the capacity to 
take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if 
parental control falters, the State must play its part . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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approach, poverty is a primary risk factor for a ﬁnding of neglect and the removal 
of children from the home, particularly for families of color.
338
 In contrast, our 
new framework sees family poverty as a trigger for the state’s obligation to pro-
vide material support so that children’s interests in remaining with parents 
might be met. Younger children also might have affirmative rights to preschool 
as part of their educational rights,
339
 and older children might have affirmative 
rights to certain health-care services such as contraceptives and abortion, drug 
and alcohol counseling, and residential care for mental health issues. By reori-
enting our focus towards family poverty, cases like Harris v. McRae, the Supreme 
Court decision holding that the federal Constitution does not guarantee women 
access to funding for an abortion,
340
 would come out differently for children. 
Our framework thus draws upon current federal and state statutory law to 
develop a model of children’s affirmative rights under the Constitution. Federal 
and state statutes currently provide families with a range of entitlements to food, 
housing, healthcare, and other basic goods. For example, the child welfare sys-
tem entails multiple services from the state, including the federal requirement 
that states provide “reasonable efforts” to reunify removed children with their 
parents before terminating parental rights.
341
 Although these are all statutory 
entitlements, they provide a blueprint for what a full-bodied scheme of affirma-
tive constitutional rights might look like. Similarly, the U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child offers helpful guidance to the development of a scheme of 
affirmative constitutional rights speciﬁcally geared toward children in the United 
States.
342
 
Under our framework, affirmative rights enrich children’s experiences as 
children: they aim to constitute civic participants, not control them; they reha-
 
338. See Andrea Charlow, Race, Poverty, and Neglect, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 763, 764-65 (2001); 
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CIN. L. REV. 1131, 1150-1156 (2005). 
339. See Ryan, supra note 302. 
340. 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980). 
341. See supra note 283 and accompanying text (discussing the Adoption Assistance and Child Wel-
fare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500); Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 
Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115. 
342. G.A. Res. 44/25, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx [http://perma.cc/65MD 
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bilitate and protect rather than punish; and they operationalize adult responsi-
bilities for children. In this sense, we envision a more transformative, affirmative 
role for children’s rights in American law.
343
 
2. Agency Rights 
Our framework also takes a fresh look at autonomy rights for children. Ra-
ther than simply extending some adult autonomy rights to children,
344
 as the 
authorities framework does, we develop the concept of “agency rights” as a way 
of emphasizing that children are active participants in shaping their own lives 
while simultaneously dependent on adults. Agency rights thus differ from classic 
autonomy interests because they encompass children’s interests as children in di-
recting their lives. Our concept of agency rights conceptualizes children not in 
relation to adults but instead as persons with the capacity to play active roles in 
shaping their present lives.
345
 Children’s agency rights therefore serve much 
more than children’s interests in exercising adult-like autonomy. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker illustrates the descriptive and nor-
mative value of viewing children’s agency rights as rooted in children’s broader 
interests, rather than in their capacity to make autonomous decisions.
346
 Tinker 
in part recognized children’s autonomy interests in political expression, but the 
Court also justiﬁed its holding on the ground that the classroom trains future 
leaders.
347
 The Court expanded on this theme thirteen years later in Board of Ed-
ucation v. Pico, with the plurality emphasizing that children’s First Amendment 
rights “prepare[] students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, 
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346. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
347. Id. at 512 (elaborating that such training occurs “through wide exposure to that robust ex-
change of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through 
any kind of authoritative selection’” (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967))). 
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often contentious society in which they will soon be adult members.”
348
 The new 
framework would analyze the issues raised in Tinker and Pico differently, focus-
ing instead on the multiple ways the right to free speech facilitates children’s 
present interests in expressing their own views, furthering their access to new 
ideas, and playing an active role in the world around them. 
Our approach would therefore dictate a different outcome in cases like Morse 
v. Frederick, in which the Supreme Court undervalued the importance of chil-
dren’s speech interests by permitting a school to suspend a student for holding 
up a banner at a school event with the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”
349
 Alt-
hough state attempts to reduce drug use are clearly important, the Court in Morse 
failed to recognize the other interests at play, including the way in which the 
speech furthered the child’s relationships with peers and his expression of re-
sistance to school authority. 
Under our framework, courts would determine the scope of children’s 
agency rights by weighing children’s broader interests in the context of a partic-
ular claim. For example, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,
350
 the 
Supreme Court held that California could not limit the sale or rental of violent 
video games to children. In reaching that holding, the Court emphasized that 
“minors are entitled to a signiﬁcant measure of First Amendment protection, and 
only in relatively narrow and well-deﬁned circumstances may government bar 
public dissemination of protected materials to them.”
351
 The Court emphasized 
that although “a State possesses legitimate power to protect children from harm,” 
that power “does not include a free-ﬂoating power to restrict the ideas to which 
children may be exposed.”
352
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown took some tentative steps in the di-
rection of recognizing and weighing children’s broader interests. The Court 
rightly respected children’s interests as consumers, as well as their interests in 
exposure to ideas, but the Court’s analysis did not seriously consider the subjec-
tive effects of playing violent video games on children.
353
 Instead, the Court 
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350. 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
351. Id. at 794 (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975)). 
352. Id. at 794-95. 
353. For a critique of Brown that emphasizes the role of government in supporting parents’ efforts 
to protect children from the harmful effects of video games, see Martin Guggenheim, Violent 
Video Games and the Rights of Children: A Critique of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Asso-
ciation, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 707 (2014). 
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largely extended free speech rights to children on the same terms as adults.
354
 As 
Justice Breyer noted in dissent, the decision was tone deaf to the adverse psycho-
logical effects these games might have on children’s present and future lives, as 
this “play” might be frightening, overwhelming, or otherwise harmful to 
younger children.
355
  This oversight is not surprising given the authorities 
framework’s focus on children as either fully dependent or fully autonomous be-
ings. The Brown Court chose to view children as autonomous, respecting some 
children’s present interests as consumers while ignoring other children’s present 
interests in protection from harm. 
Our framework rejects Brown’s all-or-nothing approach. Instead, a focus on 
children’s broader interests calls for a consideration of multiple factors, including 
children’s interests in acquiring and playing violent video games; the adverse 
impact of violent video games on some children’s subjective experience in the 
here and now; and children’s interests as consumers and intellectually curious 
civic participants. The inquiry should focus on weighing adult responsibilities 
to protect children from harm—which the Court rightly recognized in Brown—
against children’s interests in being engaged as consumers. In ruling for the chil-
dren, the Brown Court may have arrived at the right result, but for the wrong 
reasons. The Court’s analysis privileged a conception of children’s autonomy that 
displaced a more rigorous weighing of children’s competing interests in playing 
and avoiding violent video games. 
The existence of children’s agency rights will sometimes mean children have 
the entitlement to go to court to have the right enforced, as Brown suggests. But 
agency rights might also arise in many ongoing proceedings, such as school sus-
pension hearings, custody hearings, parental termination proceedings, immigra-
tion hearings, judicial bypass proceedings, and juvenile justice and criminal pro-
ceedings. Rights in these contexts might range from full-blown entitlements, 
such as the right to be represented by an attorney, to less robust entitlements, 
such as the right to be heard in custody proceedings. 
Whatever the context, recognition of children’s agency rights will sometimes 
raise direct conﬂicts between parents and children seeking control over decisions 
affecting their own lives. Under our framework, for example, a transgender child 
seeking transition-related healthcare against her parents’ wishes might have the 
right to go to court to seek judicial approval for the treatment, and courts might 
grant such permission based on the child’s broader interests in bodily integrity 
 
354. 564 U.S. at 795 (“Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legiti-
mate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that 
a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.” (quoting Erznozik, 422 U.S. at 213-214)). 
355. See id. at 851-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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and expression of identity. Irrevocable procedures might still be denied, but our 
framework would open the door to allowing some children, with medical sup-
port, to begin transitioning before the age of sixteen. Such an outcome is at direct 
odds with existing law, which generally requires parental consent before health 
care professionals may administer medical treatment to a minor.
356
 The recogni-
tion of children’s agency rights therefore may break new ground, expanding chil-
dren’s abilities to direct the arcs of their lives even as they remain dependent on 
adults for care and support. 
3. Equality and Other Rights 
Finally, our framework also embraces rights to equality and procedural jus-
tice, reconceiving important Supreme Court decisions. Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, for example, is the seminal case in the history of children’s equality rights.
357
 
As discussed earlier, the case supports our view that the Constitution confers on 
children the affirmative right to a meaningful education, but Brown is better 
known for its principle of equality. At the same time, although Brown was a path-
breaking holding for race relations, transforming the everyday lives of many chil-
dren, it did not transform children’s equality rights more broadly. Even after 
Brown, children by deﬁnition are not considered similarly situated to adults and 
therefore have few claims to equal treatment. Children may be denied the wide 
range of rights enjoyed by adults, including the fundamental rights to vote, to 
marry, to work, and to travel freely.
358
 
While our framework agrees that the state has a basis for treating children 
differently than adults given children’s unique status as children, we argue that 
this fact actually heightens equality concerns. The state should be particularly 
sensitive to equality when children are involved because so much is at stake for 
children in terms of both their present well-being and their future lives. The Su-
preme Court gestured in this direction in Plyler v. Doe, which recognized the 
right of undocumented immigrant children to attend public school.
359
 Together, 
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Plyler and Brown should be read to stand for the proposition that children’s spe-
cial status as children, particularly when it comes to education, brings with it 
heightened protection against state discrimination. 
The new law of the child also builds upon existing laws emphasizing the 
importance of expansive procedural rights for children as a means of protecting 
their privacy and reputations and facilitating their rehabilitation. In J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina, for example, the Supreme Court held that age must be taken into 
account for purposes of establishing whether a child is “in custody” and there-
fore must be given Miranda warnings.
360
 School suspensions also call for height-
ened procedural protections.
361
 And in Parham v. J.R., the Court recognized the 
need to establish greater procedural safeguards for the review of children’s ad-
mission to psychiatric hospitals given children’s special interests in personal in-
tegrity, privacy, and reputation.
362
 
Other rights for children remain to be explored, including political rights. 
Some political rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, may be ad-
dressed as agency rights. The right to vote is among the agency rights most uni-
versally denied under the authorities framework.
363
 Children simply are not con-
sidered eligible for the franchise until they reach the age of eighteen. Under our 
framework, this legal presumption is up for reconsideration.
364
 There might be 
some contexts, particularly at the local level, where older children should be 
given full or fractional rights to vote. Expanding the category of children’s rights 
to include political rights would imply a correlative responsibility on the part of 
children to participate in civic life. 
conclusion 
This Article has set forth a new paradigm for describing, understanding, and 
shaping the ﬁeld of children and law, one that is oriented around children’s in-
terests in the here and now rather than adult control. We aim to purge the law 
of traditional assumptions about children’s status as lesser adults in need of adult 
authority above all else. Our new paradigm therefore sets aside longstanding de-
bates over dependency and autonomy in order to further children’s broader in-
terests as children. We do so by offering a new conceptual framework for poli-
cymakers, advocates, and judges that focuses on children’s broad interests in the 
here and now. 
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This new framework seeks to facilitate children’s relationships through law, 
including children’s relationships with their parents as well as their nonhierar-
chical relationships with siblings, peers, and adults who are not their parents. 
The framework also articulates a broader set of actors, including family members 
and state officials, who carry legally recognized and shared responsibilities to-
ward children, including responsibilities for caregiving and protection, educa-
tion, rehabilitation, and fostering civic engagement. Finally, our framework of-
fers a robust theory of children’s affirmative rights to certain relationships, 
goods, and services, as well as a new conceptual understanding of children’s 
agency and equality rights. 
The new law of the child rooted in this framework aims to transform law’s 
treatment of children and their interactions with others, thus encouraging new 
ways of living for children and adults. Our analysis does more than describe the 
world as it is; it also uncovers aspects of children’s lives currently obscured by 
law and, in turn, reimagines how law might best govern, protect, and enrich the 
lives of children both in the present and over time. Of course, this normative 
account will be contested, and we welcome dialogue and debate about how law 
might best be reimagined to promote children’s broader interests. For now, this 
Article offers our best attempt to establish the basic framework for a legal regime 
that values children as full persons with broad interests and rights of their own. 
